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OUTLiNE
Because factual uncertainty distorts the allocation of civil
liability, this Article argues that the law should impose liability
for uncertainty. Justified on both corrective justice and eco-
nomic efficiency grounds, this liability should be imposed upon
any person who negligently aggravates the uncertainty of a civil
case by making its evidential base deficient. Because "evi-
dence" belongs to the world of inferences rather than things,
evidential damage may be inflicted in a variety of ways, far be-
yond destruction of documents and other physical tampering
with evidence. Through adoption and refinement of this insight,
the Article diagnoses the presence of evidential damage in many
legally important settings, such as mass torts, medical malprac-
tice, exposure to risk, and employment discrimination. It also
identifies a number of legal doctrines that handle the evidential
damage problem indirectly and thus attempt to resolve it within
the narrow scope of their application. Criticized by the Article
as underdeveloped forms of liability for evidential damage,
these doctrines are urged to be replaced by an explicit and com-
prehensive liability.
From the corrective justice perspective, evidential damage
should be actionable because a person sustaining such a damage
is deprived of information to which she is entitled. This depriva-
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tion makes her less autonomous in pursuing her legal rights and
also diminishes the settlement value of her case. From the eco-
nomic efficiency viewpoint, liability for evidential damage will
serve two purposes: as an incentive for people to cost-effectively
prevent evidential damage and as a vehicle for optimizing allo-
cation of the primary damage in conditions of uncertainty.
The Article also develops a remedial mechanism for cases
involving evidential damage. Drawing upon game theory, this
mechanism monetizes evidential damage by comparing the post-
damage settlement value of the case with its pre-damage value
in a way that precludes both undercompensation and overcom-
pensation of the afflicted party. In cases that became eviden-
tially damaged through fault of one of the litigants, this
mechanism is fortified by a reallocation of the persuasion bur-
den to the benefit of the afflicted party. By analyzing both the
economics and the egalitarian cast of the rules controlling the
burden of proof, the Article demonstrates that its proposed
shifting of the risk of non-persuasion will promote both effi-
ciency and fairness.
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LIABILITY FOR UNCERTAINTY
I. INTRODUCTION
Factual uncertainty resulting from missing evidence is a salient
feature of every litigated case. Absolute certainty is unattainable.
Judicial' decisions thus always involve risk of error. This risk can-
not be totally eliminated. However, it is sought to be minimized by
increasing the amount of probative evidence that needs to be con-
sidered by the triers of fact.2 Missing evidence should therefore be
perceived as a damaging factor. Accordingly, destruction of evi-
dence, as well as non-physical eradication of its probative value,
should be perceived as inflicting damage. Would such actions have
any legal consequences? Should they have any? What are and
what should be the criteria for ascribing liability to a person in-
flicting evidential damage? What are and what should be the rem-
edies available to a person sustaining such damage?
Although uncertainty is pervasive in both civil and criminal
trials, these questions are rarely brought to the fore of the legal
argument. In criminal litigation, where any reasonable doubt ben-
efits the accused-who is generally presumed to be innocent until
proven guilty-these questions are relatively insignificant. They
are, however, important in civil trials, where liability for uncer-
tainty may play a potentially decisive role in determining the liti-
gants' rights. Nonetheless, civil litigants rarely raise those
questions, which by no means is attributable to poor lawyering.
Those questions are rarely raised because liability for evidential
damage is recognized by the law only in exceptional cases, typically
involving intentional destruction or suppression of pivotal evi-
dence. Subject to these exceptions, which are yet to crystallize into
bright-line rules, evidential damage is generally irremediable.
This damage is thus largely internalized by the afflicted party as a
damnum sine injuria. In some settings, the evidential damage
problem is tackled indirectly by a number of tort law and contract
law doctrines, which provide the afflicted litigants a limited set of
ad hoc remedies.4 These fragmented remedies, however, fall short
of solving the problem.
Scholarly writings have dealt with the questions presented at
the outset in a highly fragmented and unsystematic fashion. This
1 This and related terms will be used throughout this Article generically, as referring
to both judges and jurors.
2 See generally Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J. L. & Jutus.
279 (1996).
3 See generally JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCrlON OF EVIDENCE chs. 2 & 4
(1989).
4 See discussion infra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
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neglect can partly be ascribed to the indirect doctrinal solutions of
the evidential damage problem, which emerged in different juris-
dictions. At a general principled level, this neglect has no apparent
justification. As could be expected, failure to confront the problem
directly has engendered difficulties and anomalies in the applica-
tion of the law.
This Article confronts the problem directly by focusing upon
civil trials. It argues that evidential damage should be actionable. 5
Part II of this Article explicates the nature of evidential damage
and provides a number of examples which exhibit both the impor-
tance and the pervasiveness of the evidential damage problem.
Further examples are provided in Part III, which discusses and
removes a seemingly powerful objection to making evidential dam-
age actionable. This objection is grounded in the "process theory"
of tort liability that justifies differential treatment of prima facie
indistinguishable damage situations by the savings of litigation
costs attainable through non-liability rules. We argue that this the-
ory has a limited normative force and should not bar recovery for
evidential damage.
Parts IV and V conduct a normative inquiry into the question
of liability for evidential damage. This question is examined from
two alternate viewpoints, that of corrective justice and that of de-
terrence. Remedies attendant upon liability for evidential damage
are also examined from each of these viewpoints. We develop a
mechanism, suitable for both deterrence and corrective justice sys-
tems, by which evidential damage can be reduced to money. The
aim set for this mechanism is to afford the right amount of compen-
sation to a person whose entitlement to evidential information was
tortiously destroyed by another person. Under the corrective jus-
tice account, we treat this entitlement as a valuable determinant of
a person's autonomy. Destruction of this entitlement is damaging
to a person because it impairs her ability to exercise her autono-
mous choices in enforcing her legal rights. The afflicted person
should therefore be compensated for the value of her entitlement
to the lost information. Because this information could be of value
only between the parties to the underlying litigation, its probative
potential should be translated into the afflicted party's probability
to prevail in the litigation. Evidential damage may thus also be de-
termined by its impact on the litigation's settlement value, which
would involve an uncomplicated application of game theory. Any
5 "Actionable" refers to any legal redress, including shifting the burden of proof.
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reduction in the value of the afflicted party's litigation-threat vis-a-
vis her opponent should be compensated for in this way.
Under the deterrence theory, an entitlement to evidential in-
formation is associated with its truth-value. Less evidential damage
means more information and thus greater efficiency in implement-
ing the controlling substantive law. This by itself justifies liability
for evidential damage. Avoidance of evidential damage, however,
must also be conducted within the bounds of efficiency. Its costs
should therefore never exceed the cost of the damage. Apart from
that, liability for evidential damage should account for its impact
upon the allocation of the primary damage. It should thus be im-
posed in a way that optimizes the allocation of the primary damage
in conditions of uncertainty.
Our discussion will demonstrate that evidential damage, when
inflicted negligently, should normally be actionable in torts. This
conclusion does not, however, exhaust the existing range of norma-
tively sustainable possibilities. Part VI, which discusses the remain-
ing possibility, leaves the terrain of torts by moving to evidence
law. It examines the idea of treating liability for evidential damage
as a ground for reallocating the risk of non-persuasion in the evi-
dentially damaged trial. According to this idea, when both parties
fail to discharge the controlling standard of proof (typically, that of
preponderance of the evidence) judges should rule against the
party responsible for the evidential damage. Modifying the origi-
nal allocation of the non-persuasion risk, this solution of the prob-
lem is not comprehensive. Usually, it would be available only
against the defendant in an evidentially damaged trial. Evidential
damage inflicted by strangers can be actionable only in torts. Tort
remedies will also be appropriate in cases where the reallocation of
the persuasion burden will either overcompensate or provide no
help to the plaintiff. Tort remedies, however, are also limited.
They would not always be adequate when applied against a party
to the evidentially damaged trial. In many cases, reallocation of the
persuasion burden would constitute a better remedy. Tort law and
evidence law mechanisms should therefore complement each
other, which, indeed, is the crux of our thesis.
Our conclusions in Parts III-VI thus combine into the follow-
ing normative scheme:
(1) Evidential damage should be actionable in torts under the
negligence doctrine.
(2) In a trial that became evidentially damaged, a party respon-
sible for the damage should compensate the afflicted party or,
when appropriate, carry the risk of non-persuasion.
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Throughout the Article, we mention the ways (both explicit
and implicit) in which the Anglo-American legal systems attempt
to resolve the evidential damage problem. This is done in order to
further exhibit the advantages of bringing the evidential damage
doctrine to the fore of the legal discourse. We demonstrate that
making evidential damage actionable will remove the problems
currently involved in the application of several legal doctrines.
These doctrines include, inter alia, the tort of evidence spoliation,6
market-share7 and enterprise liability,8 alternative tort liability,9
and the risk-as-damage doctrine.10 Our argument equally applies
to two contract law doctrines that can be perceived as handling the
evidential damage problem indirectly. These doctrines we do not
discuss."
6 Le., liability for destruction of some important evidence. See GOREIuCK ET AL.,
supra note 3, chs. 2 & 4.
7 This doctrine applies when a number of manufacturers separately produce an identi-
cal product which turns out to be damaging. In any such case, if the damage cannot be
identified as originating from one of the manufacturers, each of them will have to compen-
sate the afflicted person in proportion to his share of the market. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
8 This doctrine applies when the litigated damage cannot be traced back to its individ-
ual producer, but is shown to have originated from a particular industry at large. Any
manufacturer participating in that industry will accordingly be liable. See Hall v. E. I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
9 According to section 433B of the Second Restatement of Torts, this doctrine holds as
follows:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his
liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them,
the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncer-
tainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to
prove that he has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965).
10 Namely, the controversial doctrine treating bare risk as an actionable tort. See infra
notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
11 One of these doctrines, known as contra proferentem, holds that contractual ambigui-
ties should be resolved against the party who drafted the contract. This party consequently
becomes responsible for the evidential damage. In the Second Restatement of Contracts,
this doctrine is formulated as follows: "In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which oper-
ates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Corrn crs § 205 (1981).
Under the second doctrine, which applies in breach-of-contract cases, factual indeter-
minacy of the expectation damages allows the aggrieved party to recover the reliance dam-
ages even when these may exceed the actual value of her expectation interest. An
allegation that the aggrieved party would have incurred losses if the contract were per-
formed is thus required to be proved by the party in breach by preponderance of the
evidence. See id. § 349; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.16, at 930 (2d ed. 1990).
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The specific doctrines dealing with the problem at hand have
an inherently limited scope of application. As such, they provide a
number of uncoordinated ad hoc solutions to the problem, which
cannot be satisfactory. In cases involving market-share liability, al-
ternative tort liability, and the risk-as-damage doctrine, this limita-
tion is transparent. These doctrines are confined to their particular
factual patterns. They also handle the evidential damage problem
only implicitly, and thus, indirectly. Hence, their solution to the
problem is not merely incomplete, but may also be inadequate
even within the narrow scope of their application. As demon-
strated throughout this Article, the main problem upsetting the ap-
plication of these doctrines lies in the non-presence of the
evidential damage as a liability-controlling factor. 12
The spoliation doctrine confronts the evidential damage prob-
lem directly. It is, however, limited to cases where evidence was
destroyed physically, including cases that involve violation of a
duty to generate or retain documents. This limitation is premised
on a fallacious ascription of physicality to evidence. As explicated
later in this Article, evidence is not a physical essence. Rather, it is
made out of physical essences by arguments inferentially relating
those essences to a contested issue. 13 Such arguments may be ren-
dered unavailable without physically damaging any evidential ma-
terial. Moreover, destruction of evidential material will not
necessarily lead to the unavailability of the relevant arguments.
Physical tampering with evidence is therefore neither necessary
nor always sufficient for the infliction of evidential damage. Evi-
dential damage is inflicted in the world of inferences, not in the
world of things.
Normally, spoliation of evidence is actionable only as an inten-
tional tort.14 This further limitation of the spoliation doctrine is
This doctrine can be justified by the fact that the evidential damage, as related to determi-
nation of the aggrieved party's expectation interest, was inflicted by the breach of contract.
These and other specific doctrines are discussed in detail in Ariel Porat & Alex Stein,
Doctrinat Hanezek Harait" Haazdakot Leimuza Veisuma Bemazavim Tipusiim Shel
Ivadaut Begrimat Nezakim [The Evidential Damage Doctrine: A Positive Analysis of the
Law], 21 IyurY MisHPAT (forthcoming 1997).
12 For more details see Porat & Stein, supra note 11. As recently acknowledged by the
Texas Court of Appeals, "traditional procedural and nonprocedural remedies [for evidence
spoliation] are flawed by their limited scope, their inadequate preventive effect, and their
failure to provide the victim with just compensation." Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219,
221 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).
13 See Stein, supra note 2, at 307-09 (explaining the transforming nature of such
arguments).
14 See generally GoREticx ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 4; Hazen v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986) (only intentional spoliation of evidence recognized
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prompted by the reluctance to apply it in cases of negligence. Is
there anything that can justify this reluctance? For numerous rea-
sons, we find this reluctance and the consequent limitation of the
doctrine unjustified. This reluctance is linked to the allegedly "eco-
nomic" nature of the damage. Educated in the Israeli legal tradi-
tion, which softened the "economic/physical" damage distinction
long before we attended law schools,'5 we find the reluctance to
compensate plaintiffs for economic losses somewhat puzzling.
More importantly, evidential damage is not purely economic. Mak-
ing it actionable is instrumental to both the deterrence and the cor-
rective justice objectives of the law of torts, as related to physical
damages. To allow a plaintiff to recover for evidential damage will
compensate her, wholly or partially, for the physical damage she
might have tortiously sustained.
The reluctance to compensate plaintiffs for economic losses is
typically justified by the "floodgate argument." According to this
argument, allowing recovery for economic losses would proliferate
litigation and generate overdeterrence. This argument has no force
in the present case, because liability for evidential damage will al-
ways be attendant upon the afflicted party's action for some physi-
cal (or other actionable) damage. Indeed, this auxiliary character
of the evidential damage doctrine makes it special.
The ancient predecessor of the spoliation doctrine, which is
still very much alive, is embedded in the legal instruction that urges
judges to presume "all things" against the spoliator of the evidence:
omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem.16 Despite this presump-
tion's impressive age, the nature of the inferences warranted by it
as a tort); Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) (holding the same).
This limitation does not apply in California and Florida. See Velasco v. Commercial Bldg.
Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504,506 (Ct. App. 1985); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 855, 861-62 (Ct. App. 1991); Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307,
1313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)-all holding that negligent spoliation of evidence is actionable in torts. The
limitation is likely to be abolished in Alaska. See Sweet v. Sisters of Providence, 881 P.2d
304 (Alaska 1994) (holding that negligent breach of the defendants' record-retaining duty
justifies shifting the persuasion burden on the medical malpractice issue). Negligent spoli-
ation of evidence is also likely to become recognized as a tort in Texas. See Ortega, 938
S.W.2d at 219.
15 See H.C. 106/54, Weinstein v. Kadima, 8(2) P.D. 1317.
16 See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722) (the defendant, a goldsmith,
converted a jewel from the plaintiff's ring; the jury were told to "presume the strongest"
against the goldsmith by appraising the missing jewel as having the conceivably highest
value). This decision may be understood as furthering a prophylactic and a punitive objec-
tive: see GORELIcK ET A.., supra note 3, at 34.
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still awaits determination. 7 Whether it should work not only
against malicious, but equally against negligent spoliators is also
unclear.18 It is usually considered to be a discretionary rather than
mandatory presumption, which further aggravates its indetermi-
nacy.19 In addition, its application is limited to cases where eviden-
tial damage was inflicted by a party to the underlying litigation.
The comprehensive evidential damage doctrine advocated in this
17 See generally 2 JOHN H. WIoMOR,, ON EVIDENCE § 291 (3d ed. 1940); John M.
Maguire & Robert C. Vincent, Admissions Implied from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45
YALE L.J. 226 (1935). For description of the current state of the law, see 2 JOHN W.
STRON o ET AL., McCoRMicK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 193-94 (4th ed. 1992) (describing the
law in this area as rapidly changing and yet to become clear); GoRELICK ET AL., supra note
3, ch. 2 app. 5-14 (it is unclear whether the presumption should be confined to epistemi-
cally permissible inferences or should also serve prophylactic and punitive goals); Nation-
Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distrib. Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982) ("the
inference was designed to serve a prophylactic and punitive purpose"); Glover v. BIC
Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) (strong tendency to treat the presumption as dis-
cretionary in federal courts).
In some English cases, the presumption was applied only to the assessment of tort
damages; see Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1969] 2 All E.R. 718, 721 (C.A.) (where there is an
insoluble doubt between two possible versions of damage assessment, the omnia
praesumuntur contra spoliatorem principle controls the decision); General Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Firestone lyre & Rubber Co., [1975] 2 All E.R. 173 (H.L.) (the presumption applied
against the defendant by determining the measure of damages awarded to the plaintiff in a
patent infringement action through adoption of'the version most favorable to the plaintiff;
the presumption was held not to apply in proving the wrongful act itself); Infabrics Ltd. v.
Jaytex Ltd., [1985] F.S.R. 75 (in an inquiry as to damages in a copyright infringement ac-
tion, the defendant's invoices, stock records and other relevant documents were missing;
the omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem principle was applied against the defendant,
but the court held that it should be applied with caution and only in determining the mea-
sure of the damage, as opposed to the wrongful act itself). In bailment law, however, the
presumption was applied differently. See Coldman v. Hill, 1 K.B. 443 (1918) (cattle depos-
ited in the hands of a bailee was lost, and no evidence concerning the cause of its loss was
available; the bailee was found liable under the omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem
principle); Morison v. Walton (House of Lords; unpublished decision of May 10, 1909)
(cited in Coldman) (the defendant, a bailee of a boat, which he undertook to take across
the Atlantic together with a team of seamen, had no men on board; the boat was lost at
night, and there was no evidence as to whether she was lost by gradual straining and leak-
age or by a sudden and overwhelming wave. Held: the man who by breaking his contract
had destroyed the possibility of any evidence on the subject, could not be heard to say that
there was no evidence that his breach of contract caused the loss); In re S. Davis & Co.,
[1945] Ch. 402 (furniture deposited in the hands of a bailee was partly lost and partly
damaged, and no evidence explaining the cause of the losses was available; the bailee was
found liable under the omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem principle).
18 GORELICK L-r AL., supra note 3, at 40-43. See also Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863
S.W.2d 905, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("if a party has intentionally spoliated evidence, indi-
cating fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, that party is subject to an adverse evidentiary
inference") (emphasis added). At the same time, it seems to be fairly settled that negligent
breach of physicians' record-retaining duties will also activate the presumption. See Sweet
v. Sisters of Providence, 881 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1994); Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So.
2d 596, 599 (Fla. 1987). In other instances, the law is unclear.
19 See GoRELcIK ET AL., supra note 3, app. at 12-13.
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Article will therefore constitute an optimal replacement for this
presumption. The proposed doctrine should also replace all other
legal doctrines that handle the problem of evidential damage both
indirectly and incompletely.
Let us now mention a number of issues that we are not going
to discuss. All of them relate to intentional destruction of evi-
dence, a particular pattern of inflicting evidential damage which
entails well-known legal consequences. These include criminal lia-
bility,20 liability for contempt of court,21 tort liability for interfer-
ence with a prospective economic advantage,22 adverse
inferences,23 and, in cases of documents (and sometimes, in cases
of witnesses24), an exclusion of non-original evidence adduced by a
party responsible for the unavailability of the original. 5 Discus-
sion of these special consequences, which constitute fragmented ad
hoc solutions to the evidential damage problem, falls beyond the
scope of the present Article.26 As stated above, the aim set for this
Article is to provide a comprehensive doctrinal solution to the evi-
dential damage problem.
II. THE NATURE OF EVIDENTIAL DAMAGE
Evidence is an inherently relational concept. Testimony, doc-
uments, and tangibles (functioning as "real" or "physical" evi-
dence27) never constitute evidence by themselves. Rather, they are
turned into evidence by arguments inferentially relating them to
some legally material event.28 Constructed by arguments from ex-
perience, it is this inferential extension that makes evidence out of
testimony, documents, and tangibles.29 Evidential damage may be
inflicted, therefore, only by precluding an inferential argument that
could otherwise work in another person's favor. Thus, evidential
damage would not necessarily be caused by a physical destruction
20 See Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1106-13 (1987).
21 Id. at 1113.
22 See GoRELIcK ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.3.
23 Id. § 2.8.
24 See FED. R. EviD. 804(a).
25 See FED. R. EVID. 1004(1); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE § 10.2, at 1197-1200, § 10.10, at 1230 (1995); Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence
Principle, 73 IowA L. REv. 227 (1988) (advocating a broad best evidence principle, includ-
ing adverse inferences for nonproduction of evidence).
26 See generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 3.
27 See 2 WIGMoRE, supra note 17, § 24.
28 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 15, 39 (1827); N. Rescher
& C.B. Joynt, Evidence in History and in the Law, 56 J. PHIL. 561, 562 (1959).
29 See Stein, supra note 2, at 307-09.
1900 [Vol. 18:1891
LIABILITY FOR UNCERTAINTY
of some important evidential material or by not discharging a duty
to generate such material. If the appropriate inferential arguments
can still be made out, the sheer impossibility of grounding them
upon the missing material would not constitute evidential damage.
Making out these arguments without the missing material may, of
course, be more costly. Such damage, however, bears an ordinary
pecuniary rather than an evidentiary character. To retain its dis-
tinctiveness, evidential damage must be reflected in the substantive
outcome rather than in the costs of the litigation. It must therefore
be associated with an aggravated uncertainty that reduces the vic-
tim's chances to succeed in the evidentially damaged trial.
Relatedly, evidential damage may be inflicted without physi-
cally destroying evidential material. The probative value of docu-
mentary, testimonial, and real evidence can be reduced and,
indeed, nullified in a variety of other ways. The following example
(adapted from a widely known tort case 30 ) is illuminating.
THE HUNTERS' CASE
P was negligently fired at by D1 and D2. One of the shots passed
over him; another penetrated P's head, gravely incapacitating
him. D1 and D2 used identical ammunition, firing at P indepen-
dently of each other. No further evidence is available.
By merely firing at P, either DI or D2 nullified the evidential signif-
icance of the injuring shot. Thus, one of them caused P serious
evidential damage. If the non-injuring shot had not been fired, the
existing evidence would have been strong enough to mark out P's
injurer. Crystallizing in P's inability to attribute his injury to either
D1 or D 2, P's evidential damage is pecuniarily equivalent to his
physical damage. If DI is not responsible for the latter damage, he
should certainly be held liable for the former, which holds true also
in relation to D2.31
30 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
31 Not surprisingly, it was held that D, and D2 are both responsible for P's injury, jointly
and severally:
When we consider the relative positions of the parties and the results that
would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants
only, a requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to de-
fendants becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent to-
wards plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of
them injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve him-
self if he can. The injured party has been placed by defendants in the unfair
position of pointing to which defendant caused the harm.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). For an illuminating discussion of this case and related issues
(which does not, however, explore the evidential damage doctrine), see JUDrH JARVIS
THOMSON, RIGHTS, REsrrUnON, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY, chs. 12 & 13
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Illustrating essentially the same point, our second example
takes a fresh look at one of the most important issues in the area of
tort law: the controversial idea of treating bare risk as an actiona-
ble damage. We approach this issue from the evidential damage
perspective. As will soon become apparent, our approach is likely
to eliminate the controversy surrounding this issue.
IS BARE RISK A DAMAGE? 32
Hospital patient P required urgent surgery, which would have
given him a seventy-five percent chance to recover. The doctors
negligently delayed the surgery. The delayed surgery was per-
formed impeccably, but it promised P only a twenty-five percent
chance of recovery. Ultimately, P did not recover. He now at-
tributes his terminal illness to his doctors' malpractice.
It is apparent that P cannot establish the actual (i.e., individualized
rather than purely statistical33) causation between the malpractice
and his damage. Should he succeed in suing the doctors for aggra-
vating his risk of becoming afflicted by fifty percent? Those who
believe that mere endangerment of a person should constitute an
actionable tort when it increases the person's risk of sustaining
damage would answer this question in the affirmative. The issue,
however, is far from settled.34
Supporters of the risk-as-damage doctrine face difficulties in
justifying their position in cases where the risk is known not to
have materialized. If a driver passes X's car at 200m/h and X does
(William Parent ed., 1986). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1965)
(incorporating the holding of Summers v. Tice) and Cook v. Lewis, [1952] 1 D.L.R. 1, 3-4
(the Canadian twin of Summers v. Tice, holding that each of the defendants is liable be-
cause "[b]y confusing his act with environmental conditions, he has, in effect, destroyed the
victim's power of proof."). See also Sommers v. Hessler, 323 A.2d 17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974)
(a child was assaulted by a group of children on a school bus; since it was impossible to tell
which child had inflicted the litigated injury, the persuasion burden was shifted to each
defendant to absolve himself, if he can); Johnston v. Burton [1970] 16 D.L.R.3d 660, 668-69
(a holding similar to that of Cook v. Lewis made in regard of the plaintiff's co-assaulters).
32 Adapted from the landmark decision of the English House of Lords, Hotson v. East
Berkshire Area Health Auth., [1987] 1 All E.R. 210 (C.A.). For an American example
close to this case, see Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474
(Wash. 1983) (en banc).
33 Naked statistical probabilities are normally not sufficient for awarding recovery to a
plaintiff. See David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard- Justi-
fiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 2 AM. BAR. FoUND. REs. J. 487
(1982); Brian Coote, Chance and the Burden of Proof in Contract and Tort, 62 Ausm. L.J.
761, 762-63 (1988); David Hamer, The Civil Standard of Proof Uncertainty: Probability,
Belief and Justice, 16 SYDNrEY L. REv. 506 (1994); D.H. Hodgson, The Scales of Justice:
Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-Finding, 69 Ausn-. L.J. 731 (1995).
34 See infra note 87. In the actual case, the House of Lords ruled that the risk to which
the plaintiff was exposed does not constitute actionable damage. See supra note 32.
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not even notice her red Ferrari, X can hardly sue her for the risk
she exposed him to. It is difficult not to agree with this view.35 If
so, would it be consistent to agree with this view and at the same
time hold P's doctors liable solely for increasing his risk of terminal
illness, regardless of whether it materialized or not? We do not
think so. We also suspect that there is a gap between the rhetoric
employed by supporters of the risk-as-damage doctrine and their
actual intuition.
Let us now articulate this intuition. What differentiates be-
tween our malpractice case and the Fast-Driver hypothetical is the
existence of a damage in the first case and its lack in the second.
This is the only difference between the two cases. If the identity
between the plaintiffs' causes of action in both cases be taken seri-
ously, this difference should be regarded as immaterial. Each of
these causes of action is based upon an ex ante aggravation of the
risk, not upon the damage incurred ex post. We suspect, however,
that supporters of the risk-as-damage doctrine would not take this
identity seriously. They would not take it seriously because P has
actually sustained a damage that may have been caused by his doc-
tors' malpractice. Supporters of the risk-as-damage doctrine would
also agree that, if it were known that P's damage did not originate
from his doctors' malpractice, his lawsuit would have to be
dismissed.
This position is not easy to sustain. If P belonged to the
twenty-five percent of the patients that are doomed to become af-
flicted, his damage should be blamed upon nature, not upon the
doctors. And if P could be saved, the negligent doctors should be
held responsible for his actual damage rather than merely for in-
creasing his risk of sustaining it. Application of the risk-as-damage
doctrine therefore appears to be anomalous in both cases. 36 Un-
fortunately, we are unable to classify P's case as falling under
either category. We are unable to do this because the causal forces
that were at work in P's case are unknown. If so, the intuition held
by supporters of the risk-as-damage doctrine needs to be restated.
P's lawsuit ought to succeed not because his doctors aggravated his
35 But see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990) (favoring imposition of compensation duty upon risk-
creators even in cases where no actual damage was inflicted, which would channel the
compensation money into a general compensation fund).
36 This doctrine will retain its force in cases involving risks that may or may not materi-
alize in the future, because living in the shadow of harm blemishes the person's well-being.
Cf. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849, 885-87 (1984).
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risk of becoming terminally ill. It ought to succeed because P's
doctors may have actually caused his illness, a possibility that could
be confirmed or disconfirmed, if P's surgery had not been negli-
gently delayed. P's case is factually indeterminate, and it is his doc-
tors who are responsible for this indeterminacy. This
indeterminacy reflects P's evidential damage, for which he should
be compensated by his doctors.
Let us now try to assess P's evidential damage by placing him
amongst one hundred similarly situated patients selected at ran-
dom. He is one of seventy-five afflicted patients, fifty of whom
became afflicted because their surgeries were delayed, while the
remaining twenty-five were doomed to become afflicted. Because
of the evidential damage inflicted by P's doctors we are unable to
locate P within either of those categories of deserving and non-
deserving claimants. P's chance of being a deserving claimant is
fifty out of seventy-five, i.e., about sixty-seven percent. His chance
of being a non-deserving claimant accordingly amounts to thirty-
three percent.3 7 Because there is a sixty-seven percent chance that
the lost evidence could have identified P as one of the deserving
claimants, P's evidential damage amounts to sixty-seven percent of
his physical damage .3  Under the risk-as-damage doctrine, P will
recover for only fifty percent of his physical damage.3 9 The risk-as-
37 This outcome can be established in more formal terms by applying Bayes' Theorem:
p(D) = the probability of becoming afflicted either by natural causes (N) or
through malpractice (M), which amounts to seventy-five percent.
p(M) = the probability of malpractice, which in the present case is known to be
1 (since the malpractice of P's doctors is certain).
p(D IN) = the ex ante probability of affliction, given natural causes only, which
amounts to twenty-five percent.
p(D I M) = the ex ante probability of affliction, given malpractice only, which
amounts to fifty percent.
p(M I D), ie., the probability that P's damage originated from his doctors' mal-
practice, represented by the ex post inferrability of malpractice from affliction,





On forensic applications of Bayes' Theorem, see generally BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A.
VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1995).
38 This method of assessing evidential damage is explained and justified below. See in-
fra Part IV.B.
39 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at 272.
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damage doctrine can thus be seen as systematically undercompen-
sating deserving plaintiffs."
Another example, extracted from a landmark Title VII deci-
sion delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court,4 ' is no less revealing.
THE GENDER BIAS CASE
P, a professionally skilled and successful female accountant, was
denied partnership in D's firm. Remarks were made by D's
partners that P should talk more femininely, walk more femi-
ninely, make her hair look more stylish, and wear make-up. P's
interpersonal skills were also criticized: her conduct was de-
scribed as brusque and abrasive. Title VII's antidiscrimination
remedies are due to P only if she was not elevated to partner-
ship as a result of gender-stereotyping. If she was not promoted
because of her brusquerie and abrasiveness, D should prevail.
No further evidence is available.
This example is more difficult. The non-injuring shot fired at the
plaintiff in the Hunters' Case was a negligent act. In the present
case, D was entitled to describe P as brusque and abrasive. As to
D's gender-stereotyping remarks, these caused P no evidential
damage, even if taken as culpable eo ipso. Had these remarks not
been made, P's evidential task would have been more onerous than
it actually was. At the same time, it was D's conduct that intro-
duced indeterminacy into the evidence. As a result of D's conduct,
two conflicting arguments about the case acquired equal evidential
warrant:
(i) P was discriminated against because of her gender. D's ex-
planation that P was not promoted because she lacked interper-
sonal skills was pretextual. D's description of P as brusque and
abrasive needs to be understood contextually by considering the
background set by D's gender-stereotyping remarks. P was de-
scribed as brusque and abrasive not because she really was; her
behavior simply failed to exhibit a kind of femininity that would
satisfy D's taste.
40 Shifting back to the traditional "all-or-nothing" paradigm of liability will lead to
either undercompensation, Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Auth., [1987] 1 All E.R.
210 (C.A.), or overcompensation. The overcompensation problem is well-exemplified by
McGhee v. Nat'l Coal Bd., [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.) (in an action to recover for der-
matitis contracted in the course of employment, the plaintiff's disease was found to have
originated from two significant causes, which inseparably merged into one: a hot dusty
atmosphere at the workplace, for which the defendant employers were not liable, and the
defendants' negligent failure to provide washing facilities to their workers; the defendants
were held liable for the whole damage). This decision overcompensated the plaintiff be-
cause his disease was partly attributable to a non-tortious event.
41 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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(ii) Although some unfortunate gender-stereotyping remarks
were made in regard to P, she was not elevated to partnership
because she really behaved brusquely and abrasively.
Consequently, everything became provable, and when everything
is provable, nothing is. Arguably at least, this constitutes an evi-
dential damage for which D should be held responsible. 2 It is in-
teresting to note that this damage was inflicted by addition rather
than by detraction of information.
Another paradigmatic example is provided by cases involving
an unconcerted infliction of two (or more) damages by two (or
more) defendants, when those damages inseparably merge into
one. In such cases, the joint tortfeasor doctrine is inapplicable.
Determination of each defendant's liability consequently becomes
a rather daunting task.
THE THREE-CAR ACCIDENT CASE 43
Car-driver D1 negligently collided with P's sedan. D2 , who fol-
lowed P's sedan in his car, saw DI's car moving diagonally from
the opposite direction into P's sedan. D2, however, was busy
watching the sunset. He negligently failed to timely stop his car.
and consequently also collided with P's sedan. As a result of
these collisions, P sustained severe physical injuries. There is no
evidence individually attributing any of P's injuries to either D1
or D 2.
At the same time, either D1 or D2 (or both) negligently caused the
plaintiff's evidential damage. Each of them either caused this dam-
age or is responsible for the plaintiff's physical injuries. Each of
them should therefore assume liability for at least the evidential
damage." In the present case, this damage is equal to the plain-
tiff's physical damage.
42 Justice O'Connor espoused this position in Price Waterehouse, id. at 263-73. The ac-
tual holding shifted the persuasion burden to the defendant by creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption of discrimination, activated upon direct showing of a prohibited discriminatory
motive (such as gender-stereotyping) in the contested employment decision. See id at 228-
79.
43 Adapted from Copley v. Putter, 207 P.2d 876 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
44 They were, indeed, found liable under the Summers v. Tice principle. Id. at 878. See
also Eramdjian v. Interstate Bakery Corp., 315 P.2d 19, 29 (Cal. Dist. Ct, App. 1957) (up-
holding a trial court ruling similar to that of Copley v. Putter).
Azure v. City of Billings, 596 P.2d 460 (Mont. 1979) is another remarkable decision.
Injured in a bar fight, the plaintiff appeared drunk and was mistakenly detained by the
police in its search for a burglar. Disregarding plaintiff's patent injuries, the arresting of-
ficers failed to timely secure his medical treatment, which further aggravated his condition.
The plaintiff's total damage was indivisible, so that he could not prove the harm separately
inflicted upon him in the bar and by the police. The persuasion burden on the apportion-
ment of the damage issue was consequently shifted to the defendant. This ruling was justi-
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Evidential damage will typically be present in a litigation
prompted by the plaintiffs' exposure to a hazardous substance.
Along with the multiple-risk problem, this litigation involves the
problem of liability for bare risk.45
A CASE OF RADIOACTIVE EXPOSURE46
D's manufacturing plant emitted radioactive rays, to which a
fraction of 10,000 people residing in the vicinity of the plant
were exposed. P was one of those residents. Subsequently, the
annual incidence of cancer in the vicinity of the plant rose from
seventy-five to one hundred cases. P is now suffering from can-
cer. No further evidence is available.
Should P be allowed to recover from D? Not necessarily related to
D's actions, P's cancer could have been a misfortune. It could have
been caused by a variety of yet-to-become-known factors unassoci-
ated with D. However, if P had not been exposed to D's radioac-
tive rays, she would have known that she had fallen into
misfortune. Now she cannot be certain about this, which is also
true about the triers of fact in P v. D. The case is evidentially dam-
aged, and it is D, not P, who is responsible for the damage. At the
same time, holding D liable will convert into a fully-blown tort any
action that casts on the actor both undispellable and unverifiable
flied by the court as a proper allocation of the risk of error: "[W]here the tortious act is
established, it is better that the tortfeasor should be subject to paying more than his theo-
retical share of the damages in a situation where the tortious conduct has contributed to
the confused situation making it difficult to prove which tortious act did the harm." Id. at
471.
45 For discussion of the risk-as-damage problem, see supra notes 32-36 and accompany-
ing text.
46 Adapted from Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 412-13 (D. Utah 1984) (in an
action to recover for cancer allegedly caused by testing of atomic devices, the government's
failure to adequately monitor radiation exposures was held to have "yielded many glaring
deficiencies in the evidentiary record," as relates to the issue of causation, which justified
shifting the persuasion burden to the government). We suspect this decision to have
overcompensated the plaintiffs and offer another solution to this and similar cases. The
prevailing doctrinal view seems not to favor recovery in such cases. See, e.g., University
Sys. of New Hampshire v. United States Gypsum Co., 756 F. Supp. 640 (D. N.H. 1991);
Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983). Both cases exem-
plify the causation problem in asbestos litigation as thwarting recovery for asbestos-related
afflictions. See generally Richard Delgado, Beyond SindeL" Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact
Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REv. 881 (1982). In our example, reversal of
the persuasion burden would not help the plaintiffs.
But see In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 828-29 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding, in connection with burden-shifting, that "[i]f a manufacturer negligently
supplied a harmful product with the knowledge that it would be mixed and sprayed in a
mixture so that its product would no longer be separately identifiable, that manufacturer
may have been negligent in allowing the destruction of the evidence that would have ena-
bled a plaintiff to identify it.").
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suspicion of causing the litigated damage. D would be liable merely
because he brought upon himself one of such suspicions. Because
this suspicion is irremovable, it would mark D's pockets as open
not only to P, but also to any other similarly situated resident.
Likely to have brought cancer only to twenty-five neighboring resi-
dents, D will be forced to compensate one hundred. The misfor-
tune of seventy-five residents will thus be converted into actionable
damage. This decisional strategy is indeed problematic. It might,
nonetheless, still be better than that of converting the actionable
damage of twenty-five residents into a non-actionable misfortune.
D's responsibility for the uncertainty of the case tilts the scales in
that direction. But how strongly does it tilt them in that direction?
Perhaps not strongly enough. Should D consequently be held re-
sponsible only for a fraction (twenty-five percent) of each of the
one hundred residents' damage? This question will be discussed
(and answered in the affirmative) later in this Article.47 At the
present stage, it is worth noting that reversal of the persuasion bur-
den (the optimal remedy in many cases where the evidential dam-
age was inflicted by the defendant) would not be helpful to P. It
would not help P because the probability that her cancer is unre-
lated to D equals seventy-five percent, which allows D to prevail
under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. But since it is
known that this probability is conditioned upon a deficient eviden-
tial base,4 which became deficient through D's fault, to decide the
case on the basis of this probability would be manifestly unjust.
We now turn to another example demonstrating that eviden-
tial damage may also be inflicted independently of the primary
damage. Moreover, it may even be inflicted by omission.
THE SWIMMING POOL CASE 49
The plaintiff sues motel operators for the wrongful deaths of her
husband and her son who drowned while swimming in the
motel's pool. The defendants negligently failed to secure a life-
guard's presence in the pool area and affixed no warning to this
effect. No specific evidence highlighting the proximate cause of
the litigated fatality is available.
In a decision that came close to explicitly recognizing the evidential
damage doctrine, the court held the defendants liable. It ruled that
the persuasion burden, as related to the disputed issue of causa-
47 See infra notes 114-15, 129 and accompanying text.
48 The conditionalization of probabilities problem and its implications on judicial fact-
finding are discussed in Stein, supra note 2, at 299-307, 312-42.
49 Adapted from Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970) (en banc).
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tion, should be shifted to the defendants, a decision which was jus-
tified as follows:
The absence of... a lifeguard in the instant case thus not only
stripped decedents of a significant degree of protection to which
they were entitled, but also deprived the present plaintiffs of a
means of definitely establishing the facts leading to the
drownings.50
The defendants obviously failed to discharge this burden.
Evidential damage originating from an omission is paradig-
matic in medical malpractice litigation, as demonstrated by the fol-
lowing Israeli case.
A CASE OF INADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION 51
The plaintiff experienced spinal cord problems accompanied
with severe backaches. He was prescribed medications and
physiotherapy. Patients in this condition were prescribed a spi-
nal cord surgery only when their pains became unbearable. Pa-
tients exhibiting neurological symptoms were to undergo this
surgery immediately. The plaintiff underwent this surgery, but it
could not save him from partial paralysis. The plaintiff alleges
that this outcome could have been prevented if he underwent
the surgery earlier than he did, namely, when he first com-
plained to his physician-the defendant-about his neurological
problems, or shortly thereafter. According to the defendant, the
plaintiff's complaints to him pointed to pain only; when they
raised a neurological problem, the plaintiff was immediately re-
ferred to a hospital to undergo surgery. Records monitoring the
plaintiff's treatment by the defendant have been found to be
fragmentary and deficient, which violated the defendant's rec-
ord-compiling duties.
50 Id. at 474-75. For an analysis, see Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Dieth-
ylstilbestro" The Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591, 604-05 (1990)
(explaining Haft and similar cases as "a new rule of liability: If evidence is not available
and ... the defendant is responsible for the nonavailability of evidence, the defendant is
liable."). See also Dorschell v. City of Cambridge [1980] 117 D.L.R.3d 630, 635 (in an
action for damages allegedly incurred by the municipality's failure to remove ice from a
sidewalk or otherwise ensure the safety of its citizens from snow and ice, the burden of
proof, as related to the causation issue, should be shouldered by the municipality because
"breach [of] its duty to the plaintiff to keep the sidewalk clear of ice and snow has impaired
the plaintiff's opportunity of proving liability"); Clemente v. State, 707 P.2d 818 (Cal. 1985)
(in an action for damages brought by a victim of a hit-and-run accident, alleging that a
police officer who visited the scene of the accident negligently failed to take the name or
the license number of the motorcyclist who struck the plaintiff, the court exempted the
plaintiff from the undischargeable burden of proving that he could have obtained a collect-
ible judgment against the motorcyclist. The defendant's actions justified the exemption
because they made the plaintiff unable to discharge this burden.).
5' C.A. 58/82, Kantor v. Mussayoff, 39(3) P.D. 253.
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The court adopted the plaintiff's description of the events. It justi-
fied its decision as mandated (inter alia) by the defendant's respon-
sibility for the evidential damage. 2
Evidential damage can also be inflicted by a stranger to the
underlying litigation. The following example, adapted from a
landmark decision of the California Court of Appeal,5 3 is most
revealing.
A CASE OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION
A car driven by P was approached by a van which came from
the opposite direction. Suddenly, the left rear wheel flew off the
van and crashed into the windshield of P's car, severely injuring
P. The van was towed to a garage, where some of its parts, evi-
dentially critical to P's lawsuit against the driver of the van, were
inadvertently disposed of by mechanics.5 4
Can P successfully sue the garage owners for reducing her chances
to succeed in a lawsuit against the driver of the van? In our view,
this question should be answered in the affirmative, but the issue
may not always be clear.55
Evidential damage may be perceived as essentially economic.
Making it actionable may therefore clash with the traditional view
that bars recovery for purely economic losses.56 As mentioned
above, this view has no transparent justification and its endorse-
ment has not been universal. Moreover, attribution of an eco-
nomic character to evidential damage would not be entirely
accurate. In most instances, this damage will be manifested by the
plaintiff's reduced chance to recover for her physical damage. As
already mentioned, to categorize evidential damage as falling be-
tween the "physical" and the "economic" categories would there-
fore be far more adequate.
Evidential damage has no fixed temporal dimension. Inferen-
tial significance of evidential material may be eradicated not only
52 For an essentially similar decision made by the Florida Supreme Court, see Public
Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987). See also Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d
1239 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding the same). This position is also endorsed in other countries.
See DIETER GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTIcE'LAw: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM MEDICAL CARE 521-22 (1988).
53 Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
54 In the actual case, the evidential damage was inflicted intentionally. The case was
therefore decided analogously to the intentional tort of "interference with prospective
business advantage." See generally GORELICK ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.3.
55 It will depend on the duty to avoid an infliction of evidential damage, as determined
by the governing tort law policy. See infra Parts IV-V.
56 See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985).
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during and after the emergence of this material, but also before it.
This can easily be deduced from the examples provided above.
Thus, in the Hunters' Case, it is quite possible that the shot leaving
the plaintiff uninjured was fired at him before the injuring shot.
Because events resulting in evidential damage may assume virtu-
ally any temporal sequence, evidential damage is often unforesee-
able. Under the traditional theories of duty of care and proximate
cause, this may constitute a ground for not imposing liability for its
infliction.57 Evidential damage may therefore arguably be treated
as damnum sine injuria in numerous cases.
Evidential damage is dependent upon circumstantial contin-
gencies more heavily than familiar tort damages. Factors causally
relevant to a familiar damage can be abstracted from the totality of
events on relatively stable empirical grounds.58 Familiar tort dam-
ages can consequently be attributed to individuals without exper-
iencing great epistemic discomfort. Represented by the factual
indeterminacy of the case, evidential damage is usually predicated
on many variables jointly contributing to its occurrence. Like
knowledge in general, missing information can be obtained from
various sources. Therefore, elimination of one of these sources
should not, eo ipso, be regarded as evidentially damaging. Attribu-
tion of liability for evidential damage thus becomes causally prob-
lematic. The ability to satisfy the demands of the foreseeability
standard in ascribing liability for that kind of damage would be
further weakened by this causal indeterminacy. In order to be
foreseeable, a course of events ending up in a damage must be suf-
ficiently determinate ex ante, a condition that cannot be satisfied
when the issue of causation is inherently indeterminate.59
The extent of the foreseeability problem with respect to evi-
dential damage should not, however, be exaggerated. The antici-
pated emergence of this problem is partially attributable to the
current non-recognition of evidential damage as actionable in torts.
Once recognized as actionable, i.e., as a damage that people are
required to prevent, evidential damage would become foreseeable
in many instances. Its existence will be psychologically internalized
by its potential producers. Apart from that, as demonstrated by
the examples provided above, evidential damage is foreseeable
57 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 43.
58 See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 408 (2d ed. 1985).
59 Cf GOREIuCx Lr AL., supra note 3, at 28-29, 154-55 (addressing the foreseeability
problem in the context of evidence destruction).
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when inflicted directly,6° and there are numerous instances where it
can be foreseen as attendant upon a foreseeable primary damage.61
In such instances, the person inflicting the primary damage can typ-
ically foresee that the exact course of the infliction will not be iden-
tifiable. Exemplified by the Radioactive Exposure Case, this state
of affairs can be described metaphorically as involving a damage
"with no address."
It must also not be forgotten that foreseeability is a legal no-
tion with a distinctively normative trait. As such, it is situated in
the realm of "oughts." Its determination must consequently ac-
count for policy considerations quite independent of the individ-
ual's actual ability to foresee particular events.62 The need to
minimize evidential damage and make the implementation of the
law of torts (or other substantive law) more effective is one of
those factors. Another factor is fairness that needs to be main-
tained in relation to people who have sustained evidential damage.
Associated, respectively, with deterrence and corrective justice,
each of those factors deserves to be balanced against the foresee-
ability problem. Limited foreseeability is therefore not a valid
threshold objection for treating evidential damage as an actionable
tort.
As previously mentioned, monetary assessment of evidential
damage (as a value of the lost information) is predicated upon a
reduction of the victim's chances to succeed in the evidentially
damaged trial. This implies that the victim must have had a real
chance to succeed prior to the infliction of the damage. Her dam-
age would amount to zero, if she were to lose her case anyway.
Therefore, when it can be proved that the victim was ab initio not
entitled to the litigated good, she should be denied recovery. Such
proof, however, would be extremely difficult to provide without
taking unfair advantage of the victim's evidential incapacitation.
To establish that the victim would have lost her case in any event
would be possible only by ascertaining the probative value of the
lost evidence, i.e., by fully reinstating the inferential arguments
wiped out by the allegedly damaging action. This would make
good the evidential damage, which is certainly a desirable outcome,
if it could only be attained.
60 This is shown by the Case of Inadequate Documentation and the Case of Evidence
Destruction. See supra notes 51, 53 and accompanying text.
61 As exemplified by all other cases discussed so far.
62 See KEETON ET AL.., supra note 7, at 280-81.
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But it would almost never be attained. Whether the lost infer-
ential arguments have been reinstated would usually be an in-
solubly counterfactual issue. Zealous attorneys would nonetheless
take up the challenge wherever the stakes are sufficiently high. Un-
resolvable counterfactual issues would thus be attempted to be re-
solved by replaying or rehearsing the evidentially damaged trial.
The increase in litigation costs resulting from these predictably
wasteful activities is apparent.
Losses emanating from evidential damage would also be diffi-
cult to assess. Assessing them by ascertaining the actual entitle-
ment to the litigated good is patently impracticable. It would entail
an exorbitant replay or rehearsal of the evidentially damaged trial.
Assessment of the entitlement to the lost information in terms of
the victim's lost chances to prevail in her trial therefore appears to
be the only viable possibility. Under this framework, the victim's
lost chances must be translated into a probability that will subse-
quently be multiplied by the value of the litigated good.
63
III. EVIDENTIAL DAMAGE AND PROCESS CONSTRAINTS
Taken together, these difficulties may, perhaps, explain the
puzzling non-presence of a comprehensive evidential damage doc-
trine in the positive law. They may be perceived as supporting a
threshold objection to making evidential damage actionable. Mak-
ing evidential damage actionable would, arguably, complicate the
determination of tort liability, thus making it unaffordably costly.
Evidential damage, therefore, should not be actionable even when
this is justified by the reigning substantive policy of the law of torts,
such as deterrence or corrective justice. Associated with the "pro-
cess theory" of tort liability, this objection legitimizes differential
treatment of seemingly indistinguishable cases of damage. Under
this theory, substantial savings in process costs, attainable through
non-liability rules, would justify the uneven execution of substan-
tive tort law policies.64
This seemingly powerful objection is ultimately unpersuasive.
First, it can hardly be raised against the evidence law doctrine
which shifts the persuasion burden to the party causing the eviden-
tial damage. Under this doctrine, when an evidential damage is at-
63 For full discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
64 See James A. Henderson Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(1982) (advocating the "process theory" as a limit to tort liability); Fred C. Zacharias, The




tributable to the defendant and the existing evidence supports both
parties equally, the plaintiff should prevail. This doctrine would
not lead to substantial increase in the process costs, for it would not
require judges to determine evidential damage with the same de-
gree of precision that applies to an independent cause of action.
The defendant's responsibility for amplifying the uncertainty of the
case would, per se, be sufficient for activating the burden-shifting
mechanism.65 Costs involved in determining this responsibility
would not be prohibitively high.
Second, the process theory as a ground for denying tort liabil-
ity cannot be carried through limitlessly. Tort liability may be held
desirable on utilitarian grounds even when its determination is
costly: the process costs may simply be outweighed by the benefits
generated by the imposed liability. By forcing people into taking
adequate precautions, tort liability-however costly its enforce-
ment may be-may prevent even more substantial losses. In the
present context, it must by now have become apparent that negli-
gence accompanying an infliction of evidential damage is not "neg-
ligence in the air."6 Tort liability will be likely to reduce this
damage and thus contribute to the accuracy of adjudication. In the
long run, this will lead to the efficient allocation of the primary
damage.67 Apart from that, liability for evidential damage may be
employed directly as a vehicle for optimizing the allocation of the
primary damage in conditions of uncertainty. Regardless of its im-
pact on the trial costs, liability for evidential damage may also be
demanded by corrective justice. People sustaining this damage
should not be left without redress. Tort victims' rights would con-
sequently be allowed to trump utility and thus escape the net of an
ordinary cost-benefit calculus.6s
The process theory also cannot be carried through acontextu-
ally. Its persuasiveness is heavily dependent upon the context
within which it is claimed to be reigning. Paradigmatic evidential
damage situations, sought to be controlled by this theory, should
accordingly set the stage. Most of these situations have already
been depicted in the previously provided examples. At the intui-
tive level, these examples must have already generated some hos-
65 See infra Part VI.
66 The expression "negligence in the air" is taken from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
67 See discussion infra Part V.
68 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 23-29, 286-301 (1986). In Part IV of this




tility toward the idea of treating evidential damage as a damnum
sine injuria. This intuition is not hard to defend. Making evidential
damage non-actionable would allow the wrongdoers appearing as
defendants in tort cases to benefit from their own wrongs, an out-
come running against common ethics.69 Our examples also exhibit
a disturbing imbalance in the present allocation of the information-
controlling power. Much of this power-which translates itself into
the ability to hurt others without leaving evidential traces-lies in
the hands of corporations and skilled professionals. These are usu-
ally most powerful litigants. If their power is left unconstrained,
might will often be allowed to make a right. Making evidential
damage actionable would substantially rectify this disturbing im-
balance. This latter argument may require some additional concre-
tization, easily provided by our further example. Together with the
Case of Radioactive Exposure,70 this example comprises a fully de-
veloped paradigm for mass tort litigation. In the Case of Radioac-
tive Exposure, the causation issue was indeterminate in relation to
the plaintiffs. In the present example, it is indeterminate in rela-
tion to the defendants. Evidential damage, however, is present in
both cases, and it is the defendants, not the plaintiffs, who should
be blamed for its occurrence. The comprehensive evidential dam-
age doctrine, advocated by this Article, can therefore resolve most
of the problems associated with mass torts.7 '
69 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 15-20. See also Coote, supra note 33, at 772
(parenthetically pointing to "the merit of seeking to avoid the injustice of allowing a
wrongdoer to shelter behind the uncertainty brought about by his or her own breach of
duty"); Dickerson, Inc. v. Holloway, 685 F. Supp. 1555, 1569 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (in an action
brought against the U.S. government for negligent supervision of disposal of contaminated
waste fluids from military bases, the plaintiffs, owners of the contaminated fuel storage
tanks, will not "be held to an absolute standard of proof on the question of the chain-of-
custody of the government's.., contaminated waste fluids" because this "would permit the
government to gain an advantage from the lack of proof its very actions gave rise to.").
70 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
71 For full discussion see Porat & Stein, supra note 11. As for the present condition of
mass tort litigation, see Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspec-
tive, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 941-42, 949-50 (1995) (maintaining that mass torts are
poorly handled is now a matter of consensus: plaintiffs, armed with contingency fee law-
yers, seek essentially unlimited compensatory and punitive damages from sympathetic ju-
ries on the basis of mutating, and often manufactured, scientific evidence), See also Heidi
Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1, 43
(1995) (analyzing a number of solutions to the uncertainty-of-causation-problem in mass
tort litigation, and expressing efficiency-related concerns about using tort liability as an
incentive for manufacturers to eliminate uncertainty about the causal powers of their prod-
ucts prior to marketing them). We can envisage no overdeterrence in our approach, which
would not force manufacturers into paying more damages than justified by their probabilis-




DES, a drug aimed at preventing miscarriage, turned out to be
latently carcinogenic to female fetuses. TWenty years later, wo-
men whose mothers took the drug have become afflicted by can-
cer, which led to a tort action against the drug's manufacturers.
None of the cancer-suffering plaintiffs could link the specific
pills consumed by her mother with one of the defendants.
By marketing a latently carcinogenic drug (under its generic rather
than brand name), the defendants caused the plaintiffs evidential
damage. They deprived the plaintiffs of information critical to the
tortfeasors' identification. Should might (the ability to tracelessly
market a hazardous drug) be allowed to make a right (a practical
immunity from tort liability)? We think it should not. We believe
that the defendants should be held liable under the evidential dam-
age doctrine advocated in this Article.73 And if there are good
grounds for holding these defendants liable, to deny the plaintiffs
recovery in the name of the process theory would amount to a bla-
tant and systematic injustice. Similar examples, involving physi-
cians, lawyers, accountants, and banks, can easily be produced, but
are hardly required.74
The "process theory" may be unattractive also when invoked
against evidential damage as an independent cause of action, typi-
cally brought against a stranger to the evidentially damaged litiga-
tion. It may be unattractive not only because of its crude
instrumentalism, insensitive to the private concerns of individuals,
but also because it produces more disutility than utility. As has
already been pointed out, liability for evidential damage will often
produce an information-protecting incentive, thus increasing the
amount of correctly decided cases. The paradigmatic Evidence-De-
struction Case75 is certainly part of the list, which can easily be sup-
plemented with other straightforward examples. In any such case,
gations into the causal properties of their products will thus not be impelled to go beyond
estimating this probability. See infra Part V.
72 Adapted from Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). See Ariel Porat,
Achrayut Kibuttzit Bedinnei Nezikin [Collective Responsibility in the Law of Torts], 23
MIssPATim 311 (1994) (in Hebrew).
73 In the actual case, the defendants were held liable proportionally to their respective
shares in the DES market. For further applications of this holding, which exhibit the diffi-
culties involved in determining the relevant "market," see Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d
368 (Wash. 1984); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485-87 (Cal. 1988); Hymovitz v.
Eli Lilly Co., 539 N.E. 2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). For discussion of other problems see Aaron D.
TWerski, Market-Share-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 869 (1989); Judith
Jarvis Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liability, 13 PUL. & PuB. An'. 101 (1984).
74 See GoRELic ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 4.15-4.16.
75 See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984).
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evidential damage should be actionable under the general negli-
gence doctrine. A utilitarian objection to making it actionable
would thus be valid only in cases where the damage could not be
reasonably anticipated when the defendant's action was taken.76 In
such cases, resolution of complex liability-related issues would
hardly produce an information-protecting incentive. Because adju-
dication of those issues would always be costly, substantial re-
sources would be spent in vain. A non-liability rule, based on the
"process theory," would accordingly be in order. The same cost-
saving outcome can, however, also be attained under the negli-
gence doctrine, by invoking its familiar foreseeability requirement.
Unforeseeability of the damage and its non-proximate cause would
imply lack of liability.
The non-liability rule nurtured by the "process theory" may
still be defended on another ground. Because foreseeability would
be litigated in numerous cases, using it as a liability-limiting device
might still be exorbitant. This objection to liability is too sweeping.
If straightforward and complex cases of evidential damage were
separable by a bright line, to reduce the amount of complex cases
by laying down an appropriate non-liability rule would indeed be
economically sensible. Unfortunately, there is no bright line that
could give us a clear-cut rule unequivocally separating the two cat-
egories of cases. Straightforward and complex cases of evidential
damage can be separated only by a broad standard. To apply such
a standard in order to activate the non-liability rule when appropri-
ate, would be at least as costly as to determine foreseeability. Fur-
thermore, even if it were theoretically possible to separate the two
categories of cases by some highly refined set of rules, costs in-
curred by this endeavor would be patently exorbitant." Facing this
difficulty, the "process theory" and its non-liability rule may either
leave the stage completely or occupy it in its entirety by controlling
all cases where evidential damage is advanced as an independent
cause of action. Because none of these sweeping strategies is eco-
nomically (or otherwise) attractive, the endorsement of foresee-
ability and negligence as controlling standards becomes inevitable.
76 See, e.g., Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App.
1985). See also infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
77 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (a seminal article drawing attention to promulgation costs as a prob-
lem that needs to be addressed by designers of legal rules).
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IV. EVIDENTIAL DAMAGE AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
Corrective justice demands reinstatement of the status quo
when this is interrupted by a person's action that wrongfully dam-
ages another person. It requires the action's harmful consequences
to be wiped off. Losses sustained by the afflicted party should be
made good, normally by the wrongdoer. Corrective justice thus
delineates its legal framework as never transcending the rights and
the duties of the individuals involved in a damaging event.7" Social
policies, to which law of torts is potentially instrumental, are ex-
cluded from this framework.79 This insistence upon monocentricity
of the tort law doctrine8 hallmarks every individual conception
emanating from the general concept of corrective justice.8 '
The existing conceptions of corrective justice advocate similar
remedial mechanisms that will be activated in reaction to a wrong-
fully damaging action.Y Holders of those conceptions also agree
78 Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485, 526 (1989).
79 Id. See also ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW ch. 3 (1995) (examining
Aristotle's account of the "intrinsic unity" of the plaintiff-defendant relationship).
80 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353
(1978) (introducing the notion of "monocentricity" in relation to legal disputes and arguing
that adjudication is not a suitable mechanism for settling polycentric disputes that present
issues of social policy).
81 These conceptions are presented in Weinrib, supra note 78; George P. Fletcher, Fair-
ness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972); Richard A. Epstein, A The-
ory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Stephen R. Perry, The Impossibility of
General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 147 (1988) [hereinafter Perry, Impossibility];
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); JuLEs
L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 329-85 (1992). See generally IzHAx ENoLARD, THm
PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW chs. 2 & 4 (1993) (examining and criticizing corrective justice
together with other "monistic" theories of tort liability). For an instrumentalist critique of
corrective justice theories, see Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in
Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981). For a recent attempt to base
the negligence doctrine on a "social contract" that differentiates between acceptable and
unacceptable levels of risk, see Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in
Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
The following writings, also approaching tort law problems from the corrective justice
perspective, are of particular relevance to the present discussion: Schroeder, supra note 35;
Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38
UCLA L. REv. 113 (1990); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for
Risks, and Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. Rav. 143 (1990) (arguing that risk-creation as actionable
per se). But see Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOpHICAL
FoUrA1ONS OF TORT LAW 321, 322-36 (David Owen ed., 1995) (arguing that the deter-
ministic account of causation and liability for risk are incompatible). For another critique
of the attempt to base the risk-as-damage doctrine upon corrective justice, see ENGLARD,
supra, at 221-22 (because risk is situated in the domain of general probabilities, the doc-
trine professes factual separation between the wrongdoer and his victim and thus alienates
itself from corrective justice).
82 Annulment of tortious gains may be perceived as yet another objective of corrective
justice, which, in turn, will produce some tension between "gains" and "losses." An indi-
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that damaging actions can, in principle, be distinguished from non-
damaging ones on relatively stable empirical grounds. There is,
however, no consensus concerning the standards that should divide
damaging actions into "wrongful" and "non-wrongful." Some of
the theories roofed under the corrective justice concept identify
"wrongfulness" with fault and, consequently, stop short of impos-
ing tort liability in the absence of negligence. 3 Other theories
favor strict liability for a damage inflicted under certain specified
conditions, not necessarily coinciding with negligence. Under
these conditions, a person who produces damage and the person
afflicted by it are perceived as standing in a special relationship.
This special relationship justifies treatment of the damage-inflicting
action as a wrongful taking that upsets the protected equilibrium
even in the absence of negligence.84 According to one of these the-
85ories, there are generally accepted risks to which people mutually
expose each other. Because these risks are reciprocal, they are not
regarded as wrongful. But when a person unilaterally subjects an-
other person to a non-reciprocal risk, which subsequently material-
izes into a damage, the protected equilibrium is perceived as being
upset.8 6 This powerful theory will be resorted to in our subsequent
discussion.
A. The Liability Standard
Should evidential damage be actionable under the corrective
justice theory? If so, under what conditions?
Answering the first question is expectably much easier than
answering the second. Evidential damage is damage. A person
vidual wrongfully damaging another person may have gained very little or even nothing.
He will nonetheless be required to fully compensate the afflicted party even when the
damage is disproportionately large, which goes beyond the purely corrective measures
sanctioned by the system. See JuLEs L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 185-
86 (1988). As demonstrated by Weinrib (on the basis of Aristotle's writings), this tension
can be relieved. The system cannot reasonably be required to do more than its practical
best in attempting to achieve restitutio ad integrum. Because we cannot usually estimate
the actual value of the tortfeasor's direct and indirect gains, we can justifiably treat them as
equal to the loss sustained by the afflicted party. See WEINRM, supra note 79, at ch. 5;
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DuKE L.J. 277, 286-89
(1994) (correlativity of gains and losses structuring the tortfeasor-victim relationship is a
normative rather than empirical matter).
83 See, e.g., Perry, Impossibility, supra note 81.
84 See Epstein, supra note 81 (a libertarian account of strict tort liability); Fletcher,
supra note 81 (proposing to replace the "negligence-strict liability" dichotomy with a liabil-
ity for non-reciprocal risks and the consequent harm).
85 Fletcher, supra note 81.
86 Id. at 543-51.
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sustaining it is deprived of something of value. She is deprived of
evidential information to which she was entitled. This information
might have enabled her to prevail in the trial that became eviden-
tially damaged. 7 This deprivation constrains the autonomous pur-
suit of her legal rights. In so doing, it also reduces the threat-value,
87 Her position can thus be analogized to that of a person who was exposed to a risk of
becoming damaged in the future. That such an exposure constitutes harm and may be
actionable in torts (when accompanied with the relevant fault) has become widely ac-
cepted. See generally Schroeder, supra note 35; Simons, supra note 81; Richard W. Wright,
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1814-16 (1985); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabil-
istic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985); WIL-
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcruRE OF TORT LAW 263
(1987); Jane Stapleton, The Gist of Negligence: Part II, 104 LAW Q. REv. 389 (1988). See
also Joseph H. King Jr., Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involv-
ing Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1390-94 (1981)
(contributing to uncertainty of the causation issue should also be actionable).
Stephen Perry powerfully argues that under the deterministic theory of causation, risk
does not constitute harm and should not therefore be actionable:
[Ilt is individuals who are said to suffer risk damage, not classes of persons, and
therein lies the fallacy of the claim that risk damage constitutes injury in its own
right.... [If the processes that caused or might in the future cause physical
harm are deterministic, then there is no basis for saying that a person who has
been put at risk by another of suffering such harm has, just by reason of being
put at risk, sustained damage distinct in kind from the physical harm. In other
words, in cases where determinism holds, there is no such thing as risk damage.
Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, supra note 81, at 335-36. See also Stephen R. Perry,
Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L. J. 247,
252-62 (1992).
Because judicial fact-finding is not a deterministic causal process, evidential damage
appears to be actionable also under Professor Perry's account. As admitted by Professor
Perry:
[I]f a particular objective probability of physical harm reflects an indetermi-
nistic causal process, so that the reference class with respect to which that
probability is defined cannot be further partitioned, conduct that has the effect
of placing someone within the reference class in question might perhaps be
characterized as having caused a distinct form of damage. The question is not
straightforward, but conduct that places someone's well-being at the mercy of
an indeterministic roll of the dice seems distinguishable from the situations
[w]here the assumption was, in effect, that the risk-imposer would either defi-
nitely cause physical harm or would definitely not cause physical harm, but
because of imperfect knowledge we would not be in a position to say which of
these two states of affairs in fact obtained. In the indeterministic case there
seems to be a true detrimental shift in position that is simply not present in the
deterministic case (unless, of course, true physical [sic] harm in fact is caused).
Perry, Risk Harm, and Responsibility, supra note 81, at 336-37. Professor Perry rightly
observes that in cases involving deterministic causation, "[t]he assertion that the plaintiff
suffered risk damage is simply a fiction employed to get around the practical difficulties
[i]n establishing causation with respect to the physical harm." Id. at 334.
Therefore, in cases where the risk-damage equation constitutes nothing but a fiction,
we suggest to apply the evidential damage doctrine. If the defendant is responsible for the
above "practical difficulties," the plaintiff should win the case. Besides, if loss of evidential
information be perceived as harmful by itself, the difficulties pointed to by Professor Perry
would become altogether irrelevant to our thesis.
LIABILITY FOR UNCERTAINTY
i.e., the settlement value, of her case vis-a-vis the party opponent.M
As held by the California Supreme Court, to sustain such damage
is no different from being deprived of a prospective economic
advantage.89
But what makes an infliction of evidential damage wrongful?
When a bystander inadvertently disturbs the eyesight of a tort vic-
tim, thus making her unable to identify the escaping tortfeasor, the
bystander can hardly be held responsible for the victim's evidential
damage. Similarly, no liability can be attributed to a bystander
who turned his head away and consequently did not witness a tor-
tious event. An office cleaner who throws away an empty bottle
left on an attorney's table, not suspecting the bottle to be the key
evidence in a product liability lawsuit, also will not be liable. 9 But
what about the attorney? It appears that she acted wrongfully and
should therefore be held responsible for the evidential damage. By
allowing the bottle to be mistaken for trash she violated the duty to
protect evidence needed for her client's case.91 Generally owed by
attorneys to their clients, this duty can also be perceived as an im-
plied undertaking in an attorney-client relationship. An attorney-
client relationship is not the only one that involves a duty to pro-
tect evidence. Services rendered by banks, accountants, stock bro-
kers, and many other professionals often include a similar duty.
Some professionals, most notably doctors, may be required not
only to retain, but also to generate evidence. 92
Cases involving bystanders provide us with extreme and hence
obvious examples of non-wrongfulness.93 Cases that involve
88 Each of these factors is explained' below. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
89 Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984)..
90 See Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App.
1985).
91 IM at 878-79 (a dictum expressing the same opinion).
92 A duty to eliminate evidential damage may also arise when a person non-negligently
forces another person into a dangerous situation. Let it be assumed that the DES Case,
supra note 72 and accompanying text, is controlled by the negligence doctrine and that one
of the defendants was faultless in producing the carcinogenic drug. At some point, how-
ever, this defendant became aware of the drug's potential hazard and immediately recalled
it from the drugstores. He could also have obtained from the drugstores a comprehensive
list of those who purchased his drugs, but failed to do so. To compile such a list 20 years
later (when the females given birth by the DES consumers become afflicted by cancer) is
impossible. In our view, the defendant should be held liable for the resulting evidential
damage.
93 Cf. Barbosa v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 617 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(for a defendant to be liable, there must be a special duty to produce and protect evi-
dence); Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tx. Ct. App. 1997) ("courts have under-
standably been reluctant to find such a duty in the absence of some recognized relationship
between the parties of some statutory mandate that the evidence or record in question be
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breach of a duty to protect evidence, predicated upon special rela-
tionships, constitute extreme and therefore obvious examples of
wrongfulness. Cases falling between these two polarities are more
puzzling. Litigation involving an evidential damage unintention-
ally inflicted by one of the parties belongs to this category of cases.
It is certainly not a bystander case. Nor is it a case that involves a
violation of some special duty to protect evidence. 94 This "in-be-
tween" category of cases will also include tort actions where the
damage can be traced back to a number of uncoordinated risks
originating from mutually unrelated sources. As long as the dam-
age can be equally related to any of the causally relevant risks, the
tortfeasor's identity cannot be determined as being more probable
than not. In any such case, because the particular risk for which
the defendant is responsible may not have materialized into the
litigated damage, the defendant may escape liability. 95 Factual in-
determinacy of the causation issue may work in his favor. But why
is the causation issue so indeterminate? It is indeterminate partly
because of the defendant. By adding his risk to the list of the caus-
ally relevant risks, the defendant contributed to the indeterminacy
of this issue. If so, did he cause this evidential damage wrongfully?
He did not violate any special duty to protect evidence. At the
same time, it is quite hard to consider him to be merely a
bystander.
This intuition can be explained by two pivotal factors: the non-
reciprocal nature of the risk to which the defendant exposed the
plaintiff, and the fact that the evidential damage was inflicted negli-
gently. The risk's non-reciprocal nature unmistakably identifies
the defendant as its originating cause. Negligence with regard to
the evidential damage ensuing upon materialization of this risk
marks out the defendant's actions as faulty. As will be explained,
in the absence of a special duty to prevent evidential damage, non-
reciprocity and negligence will both be necessary for justifiably im-
posing liability for that damage. These two pillars of liability for
evidential damage are mutually dependent. There can be no fault
maintained for, and accessible to, the plaintiff."); GoRELicK ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 4.14-
4.15 (discussing conflicting court opinions on the issue).
94 The only special duty, bilaterally owed by the parties to a civil trial, would usually be
a duty not to incur evidential damage intentionally. Cf. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905
P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995) (holding that the defendant-employer owed no duty to the plaintiff to
keep all parts of the manlift, that malfunctioned and caused injury to the plaintiff, for use
as evidence in anticipated litigation). In our view, this holding is questionable.
95 The Hunters' Case, supra note 30, where none of the defendants escaped liability, is
the tidiest example of a case falling under this category.
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without causal identification of the person at fault. Absence of
fault will, in turn, engender insurmountable difficulties in causally
identifying the party responsible for the evidential damage.
When a litigant unintentionally inflicts an evidential damage
upon her opponent, the key issue that needs to be addressed is
whether the risk associated with the damage was reciprocal.96 This
issue is crucial for a number of reasons. Trial evidence is always
wanting. Judicial fact-finding is bound to be conducted under un-
certainty. As such, it will always entail risk of error. Risk of error
attendant upon evidential insufficiency therefore represents, eo
ipso, the accepted level of risk to which litigants are allowed to
expose each other by bringing out and substantiating their con-
tested allegations. This adversarial exposure to the risk of error is
accepted because it is reciprocal. To be considered as wrongfully
inflicted, evidential damage must thus be non-reciprocal and origi-
nate from negligence.
Fact-finding in civil litigation is based upon mutual disclosure
and the subsequent production of all available evidence. Litigants
are generally required to take all reasonable steps necessary for the
attainment of this objective.97 Under this framework, actions
taken by the litigants in connection with the evidence may make a
difference. When a relevant evidential item is unavailable, it may
be unavailable because of bad luck or because one of the parties
did something that made it unavailable. In the former case, none
of the parties can be marked out as responsible for the evidential
damage and the corresponding risk of error. In the latter case, lack
of evidence can be attributed to one party only, which makes the
ensuing risk of error non-reciprocal.
Attribution of liability in the latter case would still be ques-
tionable if the damage was inflicted without negligence. According
to a more rigorous perception of causation, which may look some-
what formal, damage produced without negligence should be per-
ceived as produced jointly by all the persons involved. In the
absence of negligence, to perceive the allegedly "active" tortfeasor
as "acting upon" the allegedly "passive" victim would be unjusti-
fied for at least two reasons. First, the above role-description can
96 See generally Fletcher, supra note 81. See also Day v. Willis, 897 P.2d 78 (Alaska
1995) (holding that law-enforcement officers owe no duty to fleeing offenders to protect
them from their own actions; the spoliation-of-evidence claim, brought against the officers
in connection with the offender's death in a car-crash, therefore fails together with its un-
derlying negligence lawsuit). This decision exemplifies the absence of a non-reciprocal risk
on behalf of the defendant.
97 See, e.g., ROBERT M. COvER ET AL., PROCEDURE 826 (1988).
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easily be reversed without distorting the narrative. 98 Second, it is
two distinct activities, not just one, that produced the damage as a
matter of fact.99 Moreover, because facts can be inferentially estab-
lished in a variety of ways, lack of particular evidence, for which
one of the parties is peculiarly responsible, would have been un-
likely to produce harm if substitute evidence were available. Lack
of substitute evidence may thus constitute an equally harmful dam-
age. In the absence of negligence as a liability criterion, this
equally harmful damage can easily be attributed to the other party.
The dual standard of non-reciprocity and negligence does not
guarantee precision in its application. It seems nonetheless to be
the only justifiable standard in allocating liability for evidential
damage. 10° Take, for example, the Case of Radioactive Expo-
sure,10' tainted with indeterminacy of the causation issue in respect
of each of the plaintiffs. In this and similar cases, the non-recipro-
cal character of the risk imposed by the defendants upon the plain-
tiffs is transparent. Engendered by negligence, this risk should be
understood as including not only the increased likelihood of con-
tracting cancer, but also the inability to obtain evidence concerning
the cause of this disease. Both components of this risk seem
equally foreseeable. Their foreseeability can be derived from the
current state of knowledge concerning the hazards associated with
radioactive rays, asbestos, and the like. The evidential damage
doctrine would thus resolve one of the most serious problems in
the mass torts area, which is still awaiting satisfactory resolution.1 1
Arguments favoring liability for evidential damage in cases
that involve more than one defendant and indeterminate causation
are more straightforward. These cases can be viewed as "at-
tempted torts" perpetrated by defendants. This is so because the
risk generated by each individual defendant could have material-
ized into an actionable damage. Any such risk would therefore be
98 The alleged victim could easily be depicted as not preventing or even coming upon
his damage.
99 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 84 (1881); Ronald H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 13 (1960); Perry, Impossibility, supra
note 81, at 154-59.
100 As remarked by Holmes, "a choice which entails a concealed consequence is as to
that consequence no choice." HOLMES, supra note 99, at 94.
101 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
102 See generally Delgado, supra note 46. See also Alan Strudler, Mass Torts and Moral
Principles, 11 LAw & PHIL. 297 (1992) (arguing that tort compensation has an expressive
value analogical to that of punishment for crime, which justifies imposition of tort liability
in indeterminate causation cases, such as mass torts). The proposed doctrine avoids this
(somewhat strained) extension of corrective justice.
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regarded as both negligent and non-reciprocal. By transcending
the accepted level of risk, it upsets the protected equilibrium. Each
defendant should therefore be viewed as adding his risk to the clus-
ter of risks causally relevant to the plaintiff's damage. One of those
risks, which cannot be singled out as the most probable cause of
the damage, had materialized. For this indeterminacy of the causa-
tion issue, which constitutes evidential damage, each defendant
should be held liable. This holding would represent each defend-
ant's minimal liability. 103 Absolving him from this liability would
logically require to hold him liable for the plaintiff's physical dam-
age, for he is undoubtedly responsible for one of these damages.
Under the reciprocal risk theory, any person should also be
liable for intentionally inflicting evidential damage upon another
person. It is only accidental risks that can properly be regarded as
reciprocal. Representing a "rapid acceleration of risk, directed at a
specific victim,"'104 intentional damage will always go beyond this
acceptable level of risk.10 5
Let us now turn to the remedies to which a person sustaining
evidential damage should be entitled. Under the corrective justice
theory, these remedies should achieve, and also be confined to, the
restitutio ad integrum. Undercompensation and overcompensation
are both impermissible. To meet this demand in connection with
evidential damage is not an easy task. How to evaluate a plaintiff's
entitlement to the lost information? After all, this information was
not necessarily beneficial, and could even have been detrimental,
to her action. At the same time, to wipe out the intuition that the
plaintiff had lost something of value would be even more difficult.
The plaintiff became less informed about her action. This undoubt-
edly impaired her ability to exercise her autonomous choices as a
person enforcing her legal rights. Before the damage was inflicted,
these choices may have included the uncompromising pursuit of
victory in the litigation, a settlement, and, admittedly, a possible
retreat from the case. These choices and, consequently, the plain-
tiff's autonomy'06 have become different as a result of the damage.
103 Cf. King, supra note 87, at 1390-94 (implying practically the same).
104 Fletcher, supra note 81, at 550.
105 Id.
106 According to John Stuart Mill, being less informed in making risk-related choices is
tantamount to making those choices less autonomously:
If either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a
bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to
warn him of his danger, they must seize him and turn him back, without any
real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires,
and he does not desire to fall into the river. Nevertheless, when there is not a
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They are now more restricted. The mere fact that the lost informa-
tion could potentially assist the plaintiff in exercising her legal
rights also justifies treating her as a person who sustained a mean-
ingful damage. For these reasons, measures should be taken to
bring the plaintiff, as close as possible, to her original, more auton-
omous, informational position. Only this will implement the resti-
tutio ad integrum requirement of corrective justice. To wipe out
the intuition that the plaintiff lost something of value will therefore
be not merely difficult, but virtually impossible. The plaintiff ought
to be compensated for her damage. Following this conclusion, we
will now offer the mechanism of reducing this damage to money.
B. The Compensation Problem
Assessment of evidential damage invites speculation because
the question, "what would be the outcome of the trial, had it not
become evidentially damaged?" is irreducibly counterfactual. 10 7
Evaluation of familiar tort damages also involves counterfactual
questions, but these questions are different because they refer to
the familiar. Take, for example, the familiar question "how much
money would the plaintiff have earned, if she remained physically
undamaged?" This and similar questions can be answered by re-
ferring to our knowledge about people and their earnings in gen-
eral. This general knowledge allows us to determine the plaintiff's
lost earnings as equal to the earnings of her uninjured equals. No
similar frame of reference is available in evidential damage cases.
Evidential damage is always unique and there is no general knowl-
edge that could enable us to assess it counterfactually.
Despite this difficulty, one cannot ignore the possibility that
the lost information could have enabled the afflicted party to pre-
vail in her trial. The possibility therefore needs to be converted
into dollars. One way of doing this is to focus on the potential
certainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself can
judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk:
in this case therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of
excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting
faculty), he ought, I conceive, to be only warned of the danger, not forcibly
prevented from exposing himself to it.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL: UTILITARIANISM; ON LIBERTY; Es-
SAY ON BENTHAM 126, 228-29 (Mary Warnock ed., 1962).
The same would apply to a person's choices about litigation and settlement. Cf. GER-
ALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 100-12 (1988) (a person's
informed decision as to her medical treatment justified by the intrinsic value of her
autonomy).
107 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.23.
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value of the lost information to the plaintiff. Her chances to prevail
in her trial by utilizing this information should be roughly esti-
mated in probabalistic terms and subsequently multiplied by her
primary damage.
Another way of doing this is to focus on the potential market
value of the lost information, by treating the threat posed by a civil
lawsuit, i.e., the plaintiff's chance of winning the case, as an asset
that the plaintiff is willing to sell and the defendant is prepared to
buy off for the right price. We will thus treat any lawsuit as having
a settlement value ranging from zero (when the plaintiff's chances
to prevail are negligible) to the claimed amount (when the plain-
tiff's victory is virtually certain). Evidential damage may reduce or
increase this value, depending on whether it was sustained by the
plaintiff or the defendant. The settlement value of a lawsuit prior
to the infliction of evidential damage will be represented by SV1.
The lawsuit's post-damage settlement value will be denoted as SV2.
Loss sustained by the evidentially damaged plaintiff will thus be
equal to SV,-SV 2. An attempt should therefore be made to deter-
mine SVI and SV2 separately, by hypothesizing two rationally self-
interested negotiations toward settlement between the plaintiff and
the defendant.
Let us start with determination of the post-damage value of
the plaintiff's litigation threat (SV2).
The basic condition for rationally preferring a settlement over
litigation holds as follows:0 8
P&d,+Cd-Sd+Rd > Pp,,p-C,+Sp-R,
when:
J, & Jd = the stakes of the litigation, as estimated by the plaintiff
and the defendant, respectively;
Pp & Pd = the probability of the plaintiff's victory, as estimated
by the plaintiff and the defendant, respectively;"°
Cp & Sp and Cd & Sd = the litigation (C) and the settlement (S)
costs expected to be spent by each party;
RP & Rd = the "risk-premium" each party is prepared to pay in
order to eliminate the possibility of a greater loss, associated
108 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. Lrr. 1067 (1989).
109 These probabilities represent the plaintiff's likelihood to prevail under the control-
ling standard of proof, e.g., her chances to persuade the jury, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that her factual allegations are true. The probability of these allegations being
true is a separate matter.
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with continuation of the litigation (which represents the degree
of each party's aversion to risk). 110
The tortfeasor responsible for the plaintiff's evidential damage
should neither suffer nor benefit from distortions that thwart effi-
cient settlements. He should therefore neither suffer nor benefit
from:
(1) information about the case held asymmetrically by the plain-
tiff and the defendant;
(2) possible inequality between the plaintiff's and the defend-
ant's spendings on the litigation and the settlement negotiations;
(3) an idiosyncratic attitude toward risk that may characterize
one or both parties-both parties will thus be assumed to be
reasonably risk-averse;
(4) the likelihood that one or both parties will embark on strate-
gic bargaining and thus foil a mutually beneficial settlement; or
(5) the defendant's incentive not to settle the case in order to
gain a reputation as a stubborn player, which would help him in
other cases.
None of these factors should be taken into account in assessing the
plaintiff's evidential damage, because this may either overcompen-
sate or undercompensate the plaintiff. Assessment of this damage
(as of any other consequential damage) should proceed upon the
assumption that both the plaintiff and the defendant will be pursu-
ing their individual interests rationally. The parties should also be
assumed to have mutually utilized the discovery mechanism, thus
making the existing evidence equally accessible to both of them.
These assumptions are required because they reflect the proper
course of events, from which the evidentially damaged plaintiff was
entitled to benefit.
Another necessary assumption holds that none of the parties
will be able to take unfair advantage of her adversary by forcing
him into making distorted choices. Partially deriving from the ra-
tionality assumption, this mutual inability should also be assumed
to be known to both parties. These two assumptions are self-ex-
planatory. An opportunity for taking undue advantage of another
person and a possibility of being taken advantage by another per-
son cannot serve to affect the assessment of the tort victim's dam-
110 We ignore the possibility of cost-shifting. Being a routine practice in England, this
measure is exceptional in the United States. We also suspect that a rational choice be-
tween litigation and settlement will not be affected by this measure. See John J. Donohue
IH, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theo-
rem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1093 (1991) (demonstrating that the settlement rate
will be identical under both English and American rules).
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age. These possibilities are extraneous to the damage sustained by
the victim. They should therefore be ignored, which simplifies the
judicial task of predicting the outcome of hypothetical communica-
tions between the plaintiff and the defendant. In assessing the evi-
dential damage inflicted by the tortfeasor, these communications
should accordingly be assumed to be undistorted by false signals.
The defendant may still be unwilling to enter into a beneficial
settlement, if he decides to build up a reputation as a stubborn liti-
gant. In assessing the plaintiff's evidential damage, this possibility
should also be ignored. It should be ignored not only as extrane-
ous to the plaintiff's damage, but also because the defendant may
ultimately lose the case. His possible unwillingness to settle the
case does not therefore diminish the value, of the plaintiff's litiga-
tion threat.
The judge may thus step into the plaintiff's and the defend-
ant's shoes under the following simplifying assumptions:
(1) information about the case held by the parties is
symmetrical;
(2) the parties are equally rational;
(3) the parties' spendings on the litigation and the settlement
negotiations are equal to those of an average litigant;
(4) the parties' attitudes toward risk are roughly similar; and
(5) there is no strategic bargaining.
These assumptions can be made quite naturally, as only the judge
will make the evaluations. Hence, Jp =Jd = J; Pp = Pd= P; Cp = C
=C; Sp = Sd= S; Rp = Rd = R.
The parties will thus prefer settlement whenever 2(C+R-S) >
0, which will always be the case because litigation costs (even with-
out the risk-premium) are higher than settlement costs. The par-
ties will always be better off agreeing on PJ as a basic settlement
value, which will allow them to divide the surplus amount 2(C+R-
S) between themselves. Because both parties are rational and
none of them can take advantage of her adversary, this surplus
amount will be equally divided between them. The post-damage
value of the plaintiff's litigation threat (SV2) will thus be equal to
JP. As for the plaintiff's saving of the expenses (C-S) and of the
risk-premium (R), because she could also save them if she sus-
tained no evidential damage, the tortfeasor should derive no bene-
fit from any of those savings. Hence, SV2=PJ.
SV1 will be determined by following the same procedure, sub-ject to the evaluation of the evidential deficiency for which the
tortfeasor is responsible. The judge should now hypothesize that
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the parties to the evidentially damaged trial are negotiating a set-
tlement on the assumption that the missing evidence is locked in a
box that will be unlocked if the litigation continues. Each party
must thus take into account the probability that the missing evi-
dence will work in favor of her adversary. This latter determina-
tion will, of course, also be made by the judge on behalf of the
parties."1 If the potential impact of the missing evidence cannot
be predicted, the judge should assume that this evidence, in con-
junction with the evidence actually available, could equally favor
either the plaintiff or the defendant (i.e., that SVI = 0.5J). There-
fore, if SV2 = 0.5J, the plaintiff will be held to have sustained no
evidential damage. If SV2 > 0.5J, the damage will be held to have
been sustained by the defendant alone. The plaintiff will thus be
allowed to recover from the tortfeasor only if. SV2<0.5J.112
In some cases, the lost impact of the missing evidence can be
appraised probabilistically on the basis of the existing evidence.
Take, for example, the famous Hunters' Case that has already been
discussed."13 If the orthodox tort law doctrine remained unmodi-
fied, the plaintiff would have lost this case without reaching the
jury. SV 2 would therefore amount to. 0. As for SV1, it would
clearly amount to 0.5d vis-a-vis each defendant, when d represents
the damage sustained by the plaintiff. The box that contains the
evidence identifying one of the defendants as responsible for the
plaintiff's damage is going to be unlocked if the litigation contin-
ues. Each defendant therefore knows that the probability of him
being forced to pay the plaintiff d equals 0.5. Each defendant
111 Missing evidence and its probative significance have been subject to a statistical anal-
ysis that employed Bayes' Theorem. See Dennis V. Lindley & Richard Eggleston, The
Problem of Missing Evidence, 99 LAw Q. REv. 86 (1983). In the absence of hard statistical
data, this analysis (more complicated than ours) cannot help to solve the puzzle. One of
the present authors had subscribed to the opinion that the subjectivist Bayesian method is
also generally unhelpful in judicial fact-finding. See Alex Stein, Judicial Fact-Finding and
The Bayesian Method. The Case for Deeper Scepticism About Their Combination, 1 Irr'L J.
OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 25 (1996) (arguing that application of the Bayesian method in
judicial fact-finding is either anomalous or otiose). See also Ronald J. Allen, FactualAmbi-
guity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 604, 608 (1994) ("[TIn order to apply
statistical concepts to cases, whether frequency or Bayesian, the dependency relationships
must be known. This is an example of a general problem ... virtually all theories of
evidence require that one know too much.").
112 Note that SV 2 is not an evidentially-based finding that can affect the verdict in the
underlying litigation and thus make good the evidential damage. The model proposed by
Lindley & Eggleston, supra note 111, will therefore work, as they implicitly suggest, only
when the missing evidence can be probabilistically reconstructed by substitute evidence
(e.g., when there are indications that the missing evidence was intentionally destroyed or
suppressed by one of the parties).
113 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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would consequently prefer to remove the litigation threat by pay-
ing the plaintiff 0.5d, an offer that will be gladly accepted by the
plaintiff. Because both defendants are equally responsible for the
plaintiff's evidential damage (unless one of them admits the inflic-
tion of the primary damage), each of them should indeed pay this
amount to the plaintiff.
It is equally plausible to hold the defendants liable, both
jointly and severally, for the whole physical damage sustained by
the plaintiff. From the plaintiff's perspective, the value of the box
equals his whole damage. If he owned the box, he would not sell it
for less than this amount. Focusing upon the injured party, this
mode of compensation well accords with the traditional tort law
doctrine.
The Radioactive Exposure Casen 4 can be used as another ex-
ample. Under the traditional tort law doctrine, P has no case
against D. Therefore, SV2=O. Because D is responsible for the un-
certainty of the case, let it now be assumed that evidence identify-
ing the twenty-five residents who contracted cancer as a result of
D's radiation is locked in a box that will be opened if P and D do
not settle the case. Both D and P should now anticipate the forth-
coming evidence to either identify P as one of the twenty-five resi-
dents for whose cancer D is responsible or mark her as one of the
seventy-five residents that fell into misfortune. SV will thus be
equal to 0.25d, when d denotes P's whole damage. D should in-
deed pay this amount to P, because by making the causation issue
indeterminate, he evidentially damaged the case. D should pay P
only this amount because if the causation issue were determinate,
he would be held responsible for causing cancer only in twenty-five
out of one hundred cases. P's chance to recover $d from D in a
determinate case therefore amounted to only twenty-five
percent. 115
Most cases, however, would not be as easy. Difficulties in ap-
plying the proposed damage-assessment principle are apparent.
Because evidential damage cannot be determined counterfactually
by resorting to general experience, it will be determined by
aleatory reasoning." 6 Focusing upon chances that may or may not
materialize, this reasoning will ascribe dollar values to the litigants'
114 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
115 As demonstrated below, this solution would also be economically efficient. See infra
note 129 and accompanying text.
116 Aleatory reasoning and its underpinnings are helpfully examined by L. JONATHAN
COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF INDUCTION AND PROBABILITY chs. 1
& 2 (1989).
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fear of the unknown before and after the infliction of evidential
damage. The difference between the two values will determine the
magnitude of the damage. Aleatory reasoning is certainly not irra-
tional.117 Settlements voluntarily reached in many civil cases are
all products of aleatory reasoning. But judgments that entail com-
pulsion are not voluntary settlements. In the absence of an actual
settlement between the parties, judgments need to be justified.
This requirement is violated if the judgment is conjectural.
The proposed damage-assessment principle constitutes, none-
theless, the best solution to the problem. A person sustaining evi-
dential damage is deprived not only of information to which she
was entitled, but also of the opportunity to reach a more favorable
settlement with her adversary. To be sure, this opportunity is
merely a chance that may or may not materialize into real dollars.
Not readily translatable into dollars, such chances are, however,
still valuable. Taking them away from their legitimate owners
would not be a harmless act. If the proposed principle is not
adopted, people sustaining evidential damage would either be
overcompensated or undercompensated. The resulting disservice
to corrective justice will not be offset by the reduced number of
untidy approximations in the judicial assessment of tort damages.
After all, rough approximations are not uncommon in this and
other areas of the law." 8
Corrective justice would be frustrated if, after recovering from
the evidential tortfeasor, the plaintiff were also able to recover
from her adversary in the underlying litigation. This anomalous
outcome can be prevented by introducing a "ripeness" require-
ment into the evidential damage doctrine. Under this requirement,
evidential damage will not be actionable prior to completion of the
underlying litigation." 9 By forcing evidentially damaged plaintiffs
to go through tenuous lawsuits, this requirement will place upon
them too heavy a burden. Furthermore, in an action ensuing from
117 See id.
118 See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding in
relation to the spoliation of evidence tort that damages should be proved as accurately as
possible, and pointing out that there are many interests protected through damages that
cannot be proved with certainty); Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that approximated damages are legitimate in such cases).
119 See GORELICK ET AL., supra note 3, § 4.20 (not favoring introduction of the ripeness
requirement). The case law on this issue is not well-settled. See, e.g., Baugher v. Gates
Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905, 913-14 (Mo. App. 1993) (upholding the ripeness requirement
in connection with similar lawsuits); Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215
Cal. Rptr. 504 (Ct. App. 1985) (not conditioning a spoliation of evidence lawsuit upon
filing of the underlying action).
1932 [Vol. 18:1891
LIABILITY FOR UNCERTAINTY
the plaintiff's defeat in such a lawsuit, the tortfeasor will seek to
establish that the lawsuit would not have been defeated if prose-
cuted more diligently. The evidentially damaged trial and the
plaintiff's action against the tortfeasor should therefore be joined.
This can be done by requiring the plaintiff to sue the evidential
tortfeasor and the principal defendant as alternate co-defendants.
Alternatively, if the plaintiff brings no action against the principal
defendant, the latter should be 'allowed to be impleaded by the evi-
dential tortfeasor.120
In cases involving evidential damage negligently inflicted by
the principal defendant, this remedial mechanism will often be in-
adequate. After succeeding in the principal lawsuit, the defendant
will contend that the lawsuit would have failed also in the absence
of the evidential damage. If the defendant won the lawsuit on the
merits, rather than by benefiting from factual indeterminacy, this
contention should succeed, thus leaving the plaintiff with no com-
pensation or, at best, with minimal compensation. But this will not
often be the case, a possibility that should be taken into account. If
the defendant won the lawsuit by benefiting from factual indeter-
minacy, so that the plaintiff's defeat resulted from her failure to
discharge the burden of persuasion, to set the plaintiff's award as
equal to the hypothetical difference between SVI and SV 2 may un-
dercompensate the plaintiff. By sustaining the evidential damage,
the plaintiff was deprived not merely of the chance to obtain a rela-
tively favorable settlement of the case. She was deprived of the
possibility to prevail in the trial by tipping the scales to her side.
Together with other factors, this chance is consolidated in the set-
tlement value of the case. It would, however, be compensated for
more accurately if the persuasion burden were shifted from the
plaintiff to the defendant. The latter should not be allowed to de-
rive any benefit from his own wrong.
Another feature of the proposed evidential remedy deserves
special emphasis. This remedy will not be limited to instructing the
fact-finders that if the existing evidence does not favor one of the
parties on a balance of probabilities, it is the plaintiff rather than
the defendant who ought to prevail. It will also draw the fact-find-
ers' attention to both the evidential damage and the ensuing possi-
120 See John K. Stipancich, The Negligent Spoliation of Evidence: An Independent Tort
Action May Be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135, 1153-54 (1992)
(advocating an essentially similar idea with regard to a more restricted spoliation tort).
19331997]
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:1891
bility of factual impasse. This two-directional instruction will make
the plaintiff's evidential remedy meaningful.' 2'
V. EVIDENTIAL DAMAGE AND DETERRENCE
The evidential damage doctrine will now be examined instru-
mentally by looking at the social utility it can be expected to yield.
From this angle, it will be examined as a means to a means-to-an-
end. Less evidential damage entails more accurate fact-determina-
tion and consequently more effective execution of the substantive
law. 22 Individuals should therefore be deterred from causing evi-
dential damage. As is true for other damages, however, evidential
damage should not be prevented at any cost. When the costs of
preventing damage are greater than the damage, taking precau-
tions would be suboptimal. Tort liability for evidential damage will
therefore be efficient when it cost-effectively minimizes this dam-
age, i.e., when the total sum representing both the damage and the
costs of its prevention is kept at its lowest. This can be attained by
allocating responsibility for the damage to a person situated in the
comparatively best position to minimize the above sum. This per-
son will thus be singled out as the "cheapest cost-avoider."'1 23
121 For full explanation, see infra Part VI.
122 The controlling substantive law will be presumed to be efficient because otherwise
judicial fact-finding would have no economic value. We thus examine the utility of the
evidential damage doctrine similarly to that of the law of evidence and procedure. This
follows Jeremy Bentham's approach, as formulated by Gerald Postema: "[w]e are to judge
the adequacy of a system of judicial procedure not directly in terms of the Principle of
Utility but rather in terms of the system's success (or likely success) in properly executing
the substantive law, and only indirectly in terms of the system utility." Gerald Postema,
The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, 11
GA. L. REv. 1393, 1396-97 (1977).
123 In what follows, we endorse the view that the "cheapest cost-avoider" status derives
from a person's position, which enables her properly to consider if and how to dispense
resources in order to avoid the damage and act upon this decision, rather than from her
actual ability to cost-effectively prevent it. A holder of this status can thus be described
more accurately as the "best assessor" of the situation at hand. As such, she will internal-
ize either the costs of preventing the damage or the damage itself. Preferences self-inter-
estedly accorded by her to one of these outcomes (through accounting for the probability
of the damage, which will determine its expected rather than full value) will achieve the
desired utility. See Gunro CALABREsi, Thu CosTs oF ACCIDENrS 68-94, 135-73, 244-65
(1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE LJ. 1055 (1972). For a critique of this approach, see ENGLARD, supra note 81, at 31-
35 (arguing that instrumentalist objectives favored by this approach will be thwarted by
their complexity and lack of necessary information).
Another approach links the "cheapest cost-avoider" status with a person's actual abil-
ity to cost-effectively prevent the damage. This invokes the Learned Hand formula, ac-
cording to which negligence will occur if B < PL, when:




In cases featuring evidential damage inflicted by defendants,
lack of liability for that damage will preclude efficient allocation of
the primary damages. This inefficiency will occur because cheapest
cost-avoiders will be allowed to pay less, or even pay nothing, for
the primary damage they are likely to have inflicted. Allocation of
liability for evidential damage to its cheapest cost-avoider may, ac-
cordingly, achieve two utilitarian goals at once. It may optimize
deterrence not only in relation to the evidential damage but also in
connection with the primary damage itself. This, once again, will
happen in cases where the cheapest cost-avoider of the evidential
damage is also likely to have inflicted the primary damage. In such
cases, deterrence will be optimally furthered by charging to each
defendant the expected value of the primary damage associated
with his actions. This value will be determined by activating the
remedial mechanism developed in Part IV. Were there no eviden-
tial damage, deterrence could be optimized more accurately by
charging the defendant for the actual losses he inflicted. But the
case is evidentially damaged, which precludes accurate deterrence.
Attainable through the evidential damage doctrine, approximate
deterrence with regard to the primary damage is therefore the best
that can be attained.
The cheapest-cost-avoider status will not, however, always at-
tach to the same person with regard to both the primary and the
evidential damages. These two kinds of damage may have two sep-
arately cheapest avoiders. Any such case will exhibit tension be-
tween deterrence, as related to the evidential damage, and
deterrence in connection with the primary damage. To optimize
(2) L represents the loss avoidable by taking these precautions;
and
(3) P represents the ex ante probability of L.
See Conway v. O'Brian, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S.
492 (1941); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). This formula-
tion of tort liability was adopted and refined by Judge Posner. See Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 87, at 54-84; RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454-69 (1990). For critique of this
approach, see Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem Ameri-
can Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33-55 (1980); ENGLARD, supra note 81, at 36-59;
Izhak Englard, Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A Critical Assessment of the
Theory's Impact on Courts, 41 U. TOROTrrO L. J. 359, 420-28 (1991) (arguing that Posner's
principle is inherently ambiguous, which makes it operationally insignificant, and that a
reductionist attempt at making it operative will oversimplify the efficiency problem and
generate distortions).
For a critical appraisal of the economic approach to tort liability, see Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42
UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994).
1997] 1935
CARD OZO LAW REVIEW
both kinds of deterrence will be patently impossible, which entails
that one of these objectives can be promoted to its full extent only
at the full expense of the other. Alternatively, some compromise
needs to be struck between these two objectives, which would lead
to insufficient deterrence with regard to both evidential and pri-
mary damages.
A. Convergence Between the Two Objectives Exemplified
Take our hypothetical DES Case with its insoluble defendant-
identification problem, 24 and consider how it could be resolved
under the evidential damage doctrine. In this case, each of the
manufacturers was clearly the cheapest avoider of both the primary
and the evidential damage. Each manufacturer was best posi-
tioned to consider the means of substantially reducing the extent
of, if not altogether eliminating, the identification problem (e.g., by
marketing the drug under its brand rather than generic name, or by
maintaining records documenting the purchasers of the drug). 125
Arguably, the plaintiffs' mothers could have eliminated the prob-
lem even more efficiently by recording their drug-purchases. This
argument is, however, unconvincing. The mothers' inadequate in-
formation about the drug and its producers, accompanied in some
cases by psychological barriers, will remove plausibility from any
attempt to assign to them the "cheapest-cost-avoider" status. It
must also not be forgotten that the drugs purchased by the plain-
tiffs' mothers were advertised as both chemically identical and safe.
Upon this warranty, explicitly or implicitly given by each manufac-
turer, the plaintiffs' mothers were perfectly entitled to rely. This
warranty sent the unequivocal message that it would be a waste of
time for consumers to differentiate between different DES produ-
cers across the country. Because the plaintiffs' mothers purchased
not only the drugs, but also their accompanying warranties, they
cannot be blamed for the evidential damage. Consequently, each
manufacturer will have to compensate each plaintiff by paying her
the expected value of the damage associated with its own actions.
This, however, will not necessarily optimize deterrence with
regard to both primary and evidential damages. 26 Leaving aside
124 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
125 This monitoring could be arranged with drugstore retailers. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robin-
son, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflection on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 729,
734-35 (1982); Richard P. Murray, Sindell v. Abbott Labs.: A Market Share Approach to
DES Causation, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1202 (1981).
126 For the possibility of holding the defendants liable on the market-share-liability the-
ory, see infra note 128 and Porat, supra note 72.
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reputation-related incentives, it will be proper to divide the DES
manufacturers into two groups. The first group will include manu-
facturers with no incentives to remove the identification problem.
Some of them will be downright hostile to the idea of removing this
problem, because the damage they produce will exceed the liability
to which theY will be exposed. These manufacturers will be joined
by those whose expected liability is going to be roughly equal to
the damage they produce. For any such manufacturer, investing in
the elimination of the identification problem would generate no
gains. The second group will include manufacturers producing less
damage than the damage they expect to pay for under the control-
ling liability doctrine. Manufacturers belonging to this group
would be interested in eliminating the identification problem, if the
costs of removing it are exceeded by the difference between their
current and future liabilities. Hence, many manufacturers will still
have no incentive to minimize the evidential damage and, indeed,
the primary damage itself.
Take a manufacturer contemplating a reduction of the hazard
associated with its product. This manufacturer will be facing an
uneasy choice. If, for example, a five dollar investment in product
improvement (per unit) will bring the anticipated damages down
from forty dollars to twenty dollars, everyone would agree that the
investment ought to be made. Although correct from a social util-
ity perspective, this proposition will not be endorsed by our manu-
facturer if the liability it will be exposed to is not going to be
reduced by more than five dollars. As long as the identification
problem remains unsolved, the manufacturer may decide not to
improve its product because other manufacturers will be sharing
the fruits of its investment. Lack of identification will allow other
manufacturers to free-ride on its investment by lowering their com-
pensation payments to the plaintiffs at its expense. Thus, if our
manufacturer and four others are held identically liable, our manu-
facturer's liability would be reduced by only four dollars, which im-
plies a one dollar loss. 127 Our manufacturer will therefore be
prepared to remove the identification problem at any cost less than
fifteen dollars. If its total investment in improving its product and
in removing the identification problem falls below twenty dollars, it
127 Calculation of this average liability per each unit of the hazardous product is
straightforward. Prior to the improvement of our manufacturer's product, this and four
other manufacturers averaged $40 liability per person. After the improvement, compensa-
tion to be paid by the five was reduced from $200 to $180, i.e., to $36 of average liability
per manufacturer. The free-riding fellows of our manufacturer will thus take away $16
from it.
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will be efficient not only from its private perspective, but also as a
matter of social utility. No such investment, however, can be ex-
pected without the evidential damage doctrine. Deterrence attain-
able by deploying this doctrine in indeterminate-tortfeasor cases
would not always satisfy the perfectionist. It would, however, al-
ways be the best economic alternative. 12
It should now be apparent that the same economic reasoning
will also apply to indeterminate-victim cases,129 such as the Case of
Radioactive Exposure.130 In such cases, the defendant will be the
cheapest cost-avoider of both the evidential and the primary dam-
age. None of the plaintiffs he unilaterally exposed to the risk of
contracting cancer was in a position to know about it, let alone
prevent it. Holding the defendant liable vis-a-vis each plaintiff will
put in motion the proposed remedial mechanism, which will end up
forcing the defendant to fully internalize the costs of his actions.
This will produce optimal deterrence with regard to both the pri-
mary and the evidential damage.
128 A similar outcome can arguably be attained under the market-share liability doc-
trine. Note, however, that market-share liability is imposed on a collective rather than
individual basis. See Rosenberg, supra note 36; Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two
Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of In-
jury, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1473 (1986). This factor made it controversial. See, e.g., ENoLARD,
supra note 81, at 219-26. Liability for evidential damage is thoroughly individual, which
places our solution of the problem beyond the controversy. Market-share liability is also
restricted to cases involving identical products, which is not the case with the evidential
damage doctrine. Furthermore, according to a more refined version of the market-share
doctrine, it will not be activated against defendants not responsible for the evidential dam-
age. Thus, in Kinnett v. Mass Gas & Elec. Supply Co., 716 F. Supp. 695 (D.N.H. 1989), a
tort action was brought to recover for fire damages, allegedly caused by a heat tape that
covered waterpipes in a house visited by the plaintiff. Unable to identify the tape's pro-
ducer, the plaintiff sued several manufacturers of seemingly identical tapes on the basis of
alternative liability and/or market-share liability theories. The plaintiff's action was dis-
missed because her "[i]nability to identify the manufacturer of the heat tape which caused
her injuries can in no part be attributed to the nature of the defendants' products, the
product defects, or the manner in which they were distributed." Id. at 700. Incorporation
of this condition into the market-share liability theory will turn this theory into a disguised
and underdeveloped variant of the evidential damage doctrine. This variant will also pro-
duce inefficiency. Take a case where lack of information, for which the defending manu-
facturers are responsible, does not allow the judges to determine the manufacturers' shares
in the market. In any such case, the market-share mechanism might remain dormant,
which would clearly be a disservice to economic efficiency. Under the evidential damage
doctrine, the manufacturers will be equally sharing the plaintiffs' losses, which will fully
compensate the plaintiffs for their primary damages. Straightforwardly arrived at through
the remedial mechanism offered by this Article, this outcome will promote efficiency. For
more details, see Porat & Stein, supra note 11.
129 Cf. Delgado, supra note 46 (supporting the conclusion in the text on grounds close to
ours, but without invoking the evidential damage doctrine); Rosenberg, supra note 36
(supporting the same conclusion on social policy grounds).
130 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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B. Tension Between the Two Objectives Exemplified
Take a tort action brought by a person who sustained two dis-
crete injuries in two car accidents, separated from each other by
one year, and hypothesize that those injuries have inseparably
merged into one. Prior to the second accident, the plaintiff's physi-
cal condition could be inexpensively determined by doctors. He
nonetheless decided not to seek that determination because he
thought he had more exciting things to do.13' In this case, the costs
of the plaintiff's decision should be internalized by the plaintiff, be-
cause neither the first nor the second defendant could have pre-
vented the evidential damage more cheaply. The plaintiff's decision
not to seek medical information thus amounted to a mismanage-
ment of the risk. He was uniquely well-positioned to prevent the
evidential damage, but failed to do so. The deterrence objective, as
related to the evidential damage, will therefore allocate this dam-
age to the plaintiff.132
At the same time, absolving the defendants from liability
would undermine deterrence in relation to the primary damage. A
conflict between the two utilitarian objectives thus becomes trans-
parent. This conflict is difficult to resolve because none of the con-
flicting objectives can easily be sacrificed for the sake of the other.
A compromise between the two objectives, i.e., the adoption of
some comparative fault mechanism, will consequently be in order.
C. The Victim's Incentives
Evidential damage will be regarded as self-inflicted and non-
compensable if its victim was also its cheapest cost-avoider. Men-
tioned in our preceding discussion, this point may be supplemented
by another point concerning the victim's burden. In some cases,
the victim will be in the best position to rectify the evidential dam-
age ex post by providing substitute evidence that can fill in the in-
formational gap. He would, however, refrain from doing this, if the
substitute evidence does not promote his compensatory objective
and liability for the evidential damage falls upon his opponent.
Thus, one of the plaintiffs in the DES Case could actually have
evidence identifying the manufacturer of the drug taken by her
mother. Fearful of the manufacturer's possible bankruptcy, she
131 Cf. Ryan v. Mackolin, 237 N.E.2d 377, 382-83 (Ohio 1968) (a similar factual setting,
in regard to which the court reached a conclusion different from ours).
132 This allocation of the damage will impel the insurers of physical injuries to condition
their coverage upon timely medical examination of the insured. Lack of this condition
would jeopardize the insurer's subrogation claim against the tortfeasor.
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may nonetheless decide to withhold this evidence. Application of
the evidential damage doctrine may thus end up in a disutility.
This argument simply says that evidential damage will not al-
ways be real. An issue of this kind would have to be resolved
through discovery proceedings and by examining witnesses and
other evidence during the litigation. If there is no evidence point-
ing to the plaintiff's attempted misuse of the evidential damage
doctrine, the plaintiff would obviously prevail. If he prevails unde-
servedly, his case would simply be categorized as one of the unfor-
tunate but unavoidable instances of injustice. This injustice would
certainly amount to a social disutility. It is clear, however, that
such occasional disutilities ought to be tolerated in order to pre-
vent the distortions and, indeed, the systematic injustice likely to
occur in the absence of the evidential damage doctrine. Besides,
evidentially damaged plaintiffs will not always have incentives to
misuse this doctrine.133
D. Negligence or Strict Liability?
Under the deterrence theory, liability for an evidential dam-
age will be imposed on its cheapest cost-avoider even in the ab-
sence of negligence. A person identified as best positioned to
weigh the evidential damage against the costs of its prevention and
act upon this decision will thus be driven to take the most efficient
course of action. This person will be held liable even when found
to have been unable to cost-effectively prevent the damage at the
time when it occurred. This liability will impel him to develop cost-
efficient measures for preventing similar damages in the future. 34
Taking of such measures can particularly be expected in the mass
tort context, where the manufacturers are in exclusive possession
of both the tools and the information necessary for elimination of
the damage.
Our proposal will nonetheless be to condition liability for an
evidential damage upon the finding of negligence. Looking be-
yond the deterrence objectives of the law of torts, this proposal is
influenced by the fact that negligence is still the prevailing standard
of liability, while strict liability for tort damages is imposed only on
special grounds, usually for personal injuries. Legal conventional-
ism is not our only reason. As already indicated, the "process the-
ory" of tort liability persuasively opposes the idea of imposing
strict liability for evidential damages. On different grounds, the
133 See Infra Part VI.A.
134 See supra note 123.
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same opposition will be voiced by the corrective justice theory.
When all things are considered together, negligence as a liability
standard therefore seems to present a better alternative. 135
VI. EVIDENTIAL DAMAGE AS EVIDENCE LAW DOCTRINE
Regulation of fact-finding under uncertainty through appro-
priate allocation of the risk of error is the principal objective of
evidence law.136 In civil litigation, this objective is pursued within a
doctrinal framework consisting of standard of proof requirements
and rules placing the burden of persuasion upon either the plaintiff
or the defendant. 37 Any such framework expresses the legal sys-
tem's risk-related preferences, as determined by its more general
normative perspective. In what follows, we present two norma-
tively plausible perspectives that can be adopted by the law. These
can be roughly described as "efficiency" and "fairness" (or, more
ambitiously, as "utilitarianism" and "egalitarianism"), which de-
notes their mutual incompatibility. We will indeed demonstrate
that these perspectives lay the ground for divergent risk-allocating
frameworks. We will also demonstrate, however, that despite this
divergence, the two perspectives afford identical treatment to evi-
dential damage cases. Our discussion will thus unequivocally sup-
port the conclusion that risk of error in an evidentially damaged
trial should be shifted to a party responsible for the damage.
As established by the preceding parts of this Article, parties to
a litigation ought to owe each other a duty of care that would re-
quire them to abstain from inflicting evidential damage upon each
other. Based on the negligence theory, this duty should not apply
to a damage that could not be reasonably anticipated. Because
parties are privy to the trial issues and the evidence, the risk of
inflicting evidential damage would usually fall within their reason-
able contemplation. Judges would thus be able to act upon a pre-
sumption that the damage was inflicted in violation of the duty of
care. They would have to decide differently only in special cases,
where the damage could not be reasonably anticipated. Under the
135 Cf. ENGLARD, supra note 81 (endorsing the idea of theoretical complementarity in
the area of torts in general).
136 See Stein, supra note 2.
137 Exceptionally (and often anomalously), this objective is also pursued by a few exclu-
sionary rules. Exclusionary rules are far more appropriate in criminal litigation, where
they should function as immunities protecting the accused from wrongful conviction. See
id.; Alex Stein, The Form and Substance of the Hearsay Doctrine: A Response to Professor
Seidelson, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 55 (1995) (the rule against hearsay justified in criminal and
unjustified in civil cases).
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proposed doctrine, an infliction of evidential damage inter panes
would lead to a reversal of the persuasion burden, whenever this
can help the afflicted party.138 The issue would consequently not
arise if the burden was originally placed on the inflicting party.139
Nor would judges have to determine the magnitude of the damage.
Its mere infliction in violation of the duty of care would be suffi-
cient for shifting the burden. Costs to be spent on settling those
issues do not therefore threaten to become exorbitant. As will now
be demonstrated, these costs will also be well-spent.
A. Evidential Damage From the Efficiency Perspective
From an efficiency perspective, a plaintiff should bear the risk
of error when the overall probability of her case does not exceed
fifty percent. Holding true subject to special countervailing factors,
this utilitarian imperative ("the P>0.5 rule") rests upon formal
proof furnished by the law and economics literature. 14°
Let D denote the value of the litigated good and allow Pi and
P2 to represent, respectively, the probabilities of the plaintiff's and
the defendant's conflicting allegations. As always is the case:
O<pl<l; 0 <P2<1 ;
Pi + P2 = 1,
when 1 stands for certainty and 0 for impossibility. The following
decisions thus become available:
d, = the plaintiff loses (the risk of error imposed on the
plaintiff);
d2 = the defendant loses (the risk of error imposed on the
defendant);
43 = a compromise reflecting the expected value of each allega-
tion: the plaintiff recovers from the defendant p1D; p 2D goes to
138 To mention again: This will not exclude the compensatory remedy proposed above.
139 Evidential damage inflicted by the plaintiff may, however, entail other consequences.
See Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (hold-
ing that negligent destruction of evidence by the plaintiff amounts to interference with
discovery which dictates preclusion of the plaintiff's evidence on the issue and, in appropri-
ate cases, may justify a dismissal of the lawsuit).
140 Its brief summary can be found in Alex Stein, Allocating the Burden of Proof in Sales
Litigation: The Law, Its Rationale, a New Theory, and Its Failure, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335
(1996). The economic model presented below focuses on the general performance of the
legal system. Its use of mathematical probabilities should not therefore be understood as




the defendant by not allowing the plaintiff to recover this
amount.1
4 1
Damages involved in each of those decisions will be dependent on
the actual state of affairs, favorable to either the plaintiff (SI) or
the defendant (S2). The average damage to be incurred by each
decision will thus be as follows:
DECISION DAMAGE IF S1 DAMAGE IF S2 TOTAL DAMAGE
d, p1D 0 p1D
d2 0 p2D p2D
d3 pIp2D p2p1D 2pjp 2D
This allows us to represent and assess the long-run probability-
damage relationships:
0 Pl 1
f, = plaintiffs absorb the damage function corresponding to di;
f2 = defendants absorb the damage function corresponding to d2;f3 = the expected value function corresponding to d3.142
141 Trial expenses and other litigation costs are temporarily ignored for the sake of
simplicity.
142 Kaye, supra note 33. Another proof holds as follows:
(1) Dd and D, (respectively) = the disutilities incurred by wrongly deciding for
the defendant and for the plaintiff;
(2) P = the probability of the allegations brought by the plaintiff;
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In balanced cases, where p1=p2=0. 5, the overall damage to be
incurred by each of the available decisions appears to be the same.
The disutilities generated by the three decisions thus seem to be
equal. This appearance, however, is misleading because it
represents only the direct damage. Further analysis shows that the
optimal decision rule for balanced cases would be di. This rule
would be optimal for three reasons. First, it would eliminate
further enforcement costs, that would be incurred if plaintiffs be
awarded recovery. Second, to allow plaintiffs to recover when
p1= 0 .5 would induce more unmeritorious claims, thus incurring
greater litigation costs. 143 Third, taking is widely perceived as
(3) 0<P<I, because the case is factually uncertain;
(4) The plaintiff should consequently recover when:
PDd>(1-P) D,;
(5) which can be reformulated as follows:
P> -.1+D
(6) In a regular case, the plaintiff's and the defendant's wrongful losses should
be regarded as equally harmful: Dd = Dp;
(7) Hence, plaintiffs should recover whenever P>0.5 and defendants should win
whenever P<0.5;
(8) Balanced cases should be decided as stated in the text.
See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065,
1071-72 (1968). See also David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 605
n.19 (1980) (reviewing MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES
IN THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL
PROBLEMS (1978)).
Under the diminishing utility of wealth assumption-which would require the legal
system to minimize large errors-d 3 would arguably be the optimal decisional strategy. If it
is assumed that bottom dollars are considerably more valuable than the top ones, so that
the average large error equals (roughly) to D2, we will arrive at the following:
DECISION DAMAGE IF S, DAMAGE IF S, TOTAL DAMAGE
d, pD 2  0 pD 2
d2 0 P2D 2  p2 D
2
d3 p,(p2D)l p2(ptD)2 pp 2D2
See Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1159 (1983).
This argument is problematic. See Stein, supra note 2, at 335-36 (arguing that alloca-
tion of the risk of error should subordinate itself to the "all-or-nothing" litigation frame-
work, as determined by the substantive law).
143 See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Jury and the Risk of Non-Persuasion, 5 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 335, 337 (1971).
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being more harmful than not giving, a perception justified by the
diminishing utility of wealth.1'
Countervailing factors appearing in special cases may upset
this analysis, which would require modification of the P>0.5 rule.
When another rule can be shown to represent the optimal
decisional strategy, it should be adopted. This may happen, for
example, in tort cases involving multiple defendants and uncertain
causation. Let it be assumed that defendants D1, D2 and D3
marketed, respectively, fifty-one percent, twenty-nine percent, and
twenty percent of identical carcinogenic pills, that each pill was
sold under its generic rather than brand name, and that it is
therefore impossible to relate the pill consumed by the plaintiff to
a particular defendant. Under the P>0.5 rule, the plaintiff should
arguably145 be allowed to recover from D1, but not from D2 or D3.
If so, any similarly situated plaintiff will also recover from D, only.
This would produce overdeterrence in relation to D, (and similarly
situated manufacturers) and underdeterrence in relation to D2 and
D3 (and similarly situated manufacturers). The P>0.5 rule can thus
be seen as both unduly weakening and inefficiently intensifying the
tort law incentives. Losses emanating from this distortion would be
enormous. Decisional strategy d3 therefore becomes more suitable
for such cases.
To have another example, take a statute that prohibits
discrimination in employment, defining it as "using race or gender
as a criterion for employment-related decision."'146 Because proof
of discriminatory animus is not readily available, and because it is
always open to an employer to invent a non-discriminatory post
hoc justification for the contested decision, most cases of alleged
discrimination would be (and, in fact, are) factually indeterminate.
The P>0.5 rule would give no redress to the employee in any such
144 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONONuc ANALYSIS OF LAW 552 (4th ed. 1992). This
explanation is predicated upon taking the preferences of an abstract average litigant as a
controlling standard, which leaves room for exceptions.
Empirical research has shown that giving away a psychologically "vested" right is
perceived as more painful than not seizing upon an identically valuable, but
psychologically "unvested" right. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S260 (1986). Tmis MAY ALSO
ExPLA/N THE P>0.5 condition for allowing plaintiffs to recover from defendants.
145 We use this qualifier because not everyone would agree that naked statistical
evidence is sufficiently probative. See Coote, supra note 33; Kaye, supra note 33; Hamer,
supra note 33; Hodgson, supra note 33.
146 This definition replicates the United States Supreme Court's understanding of
employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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case. Sexist and racist employers would thus be left underdeterred.
Because employment discrimination is not merely unfair but is also
economically inefficient, 147 d2 would appear to be the optimal
decisional strategy for balanced cases. 14 Application of the P>0.5
rule in such cases would generate administrative savings only: somejudgment-enforcement costs will be saved, and some undeserving
employees will refrain from suing their employers. Because the
diminishing-utility-of-wealth justification would usually be alien to
the Employee v. Employer cases, there would be no further
significant savings. Furthermore, administrative costs savable
under the P>0.5 rule would be offset by the gains deriving from the
deterred discrimination under d2. As in the previous example, no
empirical research is needed for treating these gains, whenjuxtaposed with those generated by dl, as an offsetting factor.149
Factors offsetting the savings deriving from the P>0.5 rule
would normally be associated with the policy underlying the
relevant substantive law. In a rational fact-finding environment,
procedural policies facilitating ascertainment of the truth cannot
outperform this rule economically. Procedural policies often
thought of as justifying replacement of the P>0.5 rule divide into
two:
(1) counteracting a superior access to the evidence enjoyed by
one of the litigants by shifting to him the persuasion burden; and
(2) upholding the regular course of events, as evidenced by gen-
eral experience, by shifting the persuasion burden to the party
alleging the irregular.150
Policy (1) does not rest on firm foundations. Under modem dis-
covery systems, further strengthened by adverse inferences and
other incentives to come forward with evidence, informationally
advantaged litigants are unlikely to retain their advantage. When a
litigant's informational advantage disappears, it can no longer
mark him out as a bearer of the risk of error. Intentional withhold-
ing of evidence can mark him out as a bearer of that risk, but his
past informational advantage is hardly a good reason for labeling
him as a suppressor of evidence.
147 See, e.g., Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and Removing Sexism from
Employment. The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REv. 1, 33-57 (1995).
148 See id Professor Brookins's detailed study favors this view.
149 See id. (demonstrating that factual indeterminacy systematically frustrates the
egalitarian promise of Tie VII).
150 See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law from the Acceptance-Rejection Ful-
crum, 104 YALE L.J. 129, 135-52 (1994).
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Furthermore, production of favorable evidence needs no spe-
cial incentives. As for unfavorable evidence, would it be produced
by an informationally advantaged defendant if balanced cases were
controlled by d2? This question can be answered only in the nega-
tive. Producing unambiguously unfavorable evidence entails a cer-
tain loss on the issue, whereby carrying the risk of non-persuasion
entails only a probable loss. Decisional strategy d2 will thus fail to
impress Holmes's "Bad Man," who is not a truth-lover. Working
against Bad Men and truth-lovers alike, strategy d2 does not prom-
ise to produce more correct than incorrect verdicts. Lack of that
promise is predicated on the fact that the ratio of Bad Men v.
Truth-Lovers is unknown and, indeed, unknowable. At the same
time, this strategy will exert a chilling effect upon at least some
truth-lovers, who will tend to suppress evidence not unambiguously
supportive of their own allegations, which they believe to be true.
This chilling effect will result from these truth-lovers' apprehension
that every factual ambiguity, justifiably or not, will benefit their
opponents. Policy (1) thus cannot justify a shift from d, to d2 in a
balanced case.15'
Policy (2) is no better, for it involves an anomalous double-
counting, warned against by Professor Vaughn Ball:
The risk of non-persuasion is allocated (a great part of the time,
at least) upon the basis of the probability of the existence of the
fact in the run of cases of the particular kind, absent any specific
evidence. Since the evidence and the jury's consideration of it
have come to naught, we will make the fewest mistakes if we let
the case fall back into the general class, to be decided on those
original probabilities. But the jury, unless it lacks the common
knowledge we ascribe to it by definition, has begun its own de-
liberation with those probabilities in mind, and it is the combi-
nation of both those and the probabilities drawn from the
specific evidence, that the jury says are at a balance. If we then
use the initial probabilities to remove the balance, we are in
some sense counting them twice.' 52
This quotation and its clear implications call for no further
comment.
Should the P>0.5 rule be affected by a litigant's responsibility
for evidential damage? Answering this question requires some pre-
liminary clearing of the ground. First, evidential damage inflicted
intentionally should be eliminated from consideration. Cases in-
151 See Stein, supra note 140, at 203-04.
152 Vaughn C. Ball, The Moment of Truth: Probability Theory and Standards of Proof, 14
VAND. L. REv. 807, 817-18 (1961).
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volving such damage justify adverse inferences against the spolia-
tor. When prescribed routinely, as they should, those inferences
would adequately compensate the afflicted litigants. Second, evi-
dential damage inflicted without fault should not be counted
against the inflicting party. Manifested not only by the unavailable
sources of information, but also by their unavailable substitutes,
such damage can normally be attributed to both parties. When
fault is not a controlling factor, at least one of the missing sources
of information can be linked to the plaintiff and the defendant
alike. Liability for faultless evidential damage would also produce
no gains that could offset the savings generated by the P>0.5 rule.
Evidential damage resulting from negligence will therefore be our
only concern. Third, non-balanced cases, where the evidence favors
one of the parties, should also be excluded from consideration.
The losing party in such a case may still be a true victim of eviden-
tial damage. However, given the unintentional character of the
damage and the preponderance of the evidence favoring the other
party, such an outcome is generally unlikely. Furthermore, the af-
flicted party would be allowed to sue the spoliator in torts, which
would enable her to recover compensation for her lost chance to
prevail in the evidentially damaged trial.153 The restitutio ad in-
tegrum principle would thus be observed.
The question that opened the previous paragraph thus arises
only in relation to defendants negligently causing evidential dam-
age.'5 4 Do such cases justify a departure from the P>0.5 rule? We
think they do, and will begin our explanation by stating the obvi-
ous. Defendants and plaintiffs alike have incentives not to destroy
unfavorable evidence intentionally. Intentional destruction of evi-
dence is penalized under the criminal law and by adverse infer-
ences, and normally constitutes a tort. 55 Unintentional destruction
of evidence or eradication of its probative value is not a crime. For
obvious reasons, adverse inferences are not warranted by it episte-
mically. Usually, it does not constitute a tort. Even when it is ac-
tionable in torts, compensation afforded to the average plaintiff
153 This would equate the spoliator's position with that of a stranger to the evidentially
damaged litigation, as happened, e.g., in Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (plaintiff unable to prove medical malpractice can sue doctors for failure to
comply with their record.retaining duties).
154 Because a balanced case will be lost by the plaintiff anyway, his responsibility for
evidential damage would add nothing to the defendant. The P>0.5 rule should thus remain
unchanged. This, of course, should not immunize the plaintiff from other measures. See
supra note 139.
155 See GoRELICK ET AL., supra note 3, chs. 2 & 4.
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falls far below the amount litigated at an evidentially damaged
trial.156 The resulting deterrence will thus often be insufficient. 157
Missing evidence introduces indeterminacy into the case by
posing counterfactual questions about its potential impact on the
outcome of the trial. Under the P>0.5 rule, factual indeterminacy
works in favor of the defendant. By working in the defendant's
favor, the P>0.5 rule impels plaintiffs to exercise caution over evi-
dence. There is, however, no incentive for defendants to exercise
caution over unfavorable evidence. Adoption of d2 as a rule that
would control balanced cases involving evidential damage inflicted
by defendants would provide the required incentive. By protecting
evidence, it would increase the amount of correctly decided cases,
thus producing a social gain likely to offset the savings generated
by the P>0.5 rule.
This conclusion is corroborated by three additional factors.
First, savings generated by the P>0.5 rule in cases involving eviden-
tial damage inflicted by defendants will fall below their usual rate.
Because there is always some likelihood that the damage will be
regarded by the judges as intentional, thus activating adverse infer-
ences against the defendant, the P>0.5 rule will not deter plaintiffs
from filing insufficiently supported lawsuits. Hoping that adverse
inferences will fill in the gap, plaintiffs will not consider the lack of
positive proof as a serious obstacle. The possibility of such infer-
ences is also likely to immunize plaintiffs from directed dismissals
of their lawsuits.
As for the enforcement and other administrative costs, they
may even be reduced by an increase in the rate of settlements, in
comparison with the rate attainable under the P>0.5 rule. Deci-
sional strategy d2 is meant to control only balanced cases that re-
main unsettled. Some of those cases will be settled out of court
without addressing the evidential damage issue. Under symmetri-
cal information, attainable through aggressive discovery rules and
other procedural and evidentiary devices, plaintiffs and defendants
are likely to settle such cases by dividing the stakes equally. This,
however, will not always happen. In many balanced cases, parties
will fail to reach a settlement. The causes of this failure and the
156 See id. § 4.23; Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Princi-
ples, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 394-97 (1995) (both emphasizing the difficulties in determin-
ing damages in spoliation-of-evidence cases).
157 See, e.g., Ortega v. Trevino, 938 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997). This may give
rise to the controversial idea of awarding plaintiffs punitive damages. Cf. Nolte, supra note




possibility of counteracting them by d2 are best explained through a
formal analysis of the settlement problem.158 Under symmetrical
information, if the parties are similarly averse toward risk and they
expect to spend similar amounts on litigation and settlement nego-
tiations, a settlement would be the only rational solution of the dis-
pute. Litigation would only make sense when:
PJ-C+S-R > PJ+C-S+R.
The left side of this formula represents the plaintiffs expected
gain from the litigation, as reduced by her litigation costs, by the
risk-eliminating premium she is prepared to pay in order to avoid
the uncertain litigation, and increased by her saved settlement
costs. The right side represents the defendant's expected loss, ag-
gravated by his litigation costs, by the risk-eliminating premium
he is willing to pay in order to avoid the uncertain litigation, and
mitigated by the saved settlement costs. 159
It would thus make sense only when 2(C+R-S) < 0 (or, theoreti-
cally, when 2(C+R-S) = 0), which will never occur because litiga-
tion costs alone are substantially higher than settlement costs. The
parties will therefore be better off agreeing on PJ as a settlement
value, which will allow them to divide amongst themselves the sur-
plus amount 2(C+R-S).
The parties may nonetheless fail to reach a settlement if one of
them decides to behave strategically in order to enlarge her share
in the settlement pie. Displaying stubbornness and other tough
hold-out tactics, such strategic behavior may be misread by the
other side as a no-settlement stance. Apart from that, when a
party anticipates her adversary to behave strategically, she herself
might resort to a preemptive display of intransigence. The parties
may consequently end up litigating instead of expediently settling
the case.
That strategic behavior is likely to take place in balanced cases
is apparent. When the scales of justice can easily be tilted in either
direction, an adversarial threat to tilt them against the opponent
looks more credible and is therefore more tempting to make. In
cases involving evidential damage negligently inflicted by defend-
ants, such behavior is most likely to be resorted to by defendants.
This estimation does not derive solely from the advantage be-
stowed upon defendants by the P>0.5 rule. That this advantage
158 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
159 The possibility of cost-shifting is not accounted for by the formula because we sus-
pect it to be unimportant in the present context. See Donohue, supra note 110.
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will make some defendants more optimistic about the case and
consequently more prone to risk a good settlement by embarking
upon strategic behavior, clearly supports our estimation. There is,
however, a more compelling reason that makes our estimation
more than intuitive guesswork. As already indicated, typical cases
involving evidential damage inflicted by defendants are cases
where defendants exercised superior power over relevant informa-
tion, and not fortuitously.160 Evidential damage is, in fact, never
entirely accidental. Inflicted by those who had more opportunities
to inflict it, this damage is sustained mostly by those who had the
least power to resist it. The typical cases that we are to consider
involve corporate and other institutional defendants (including
professionals), litigating against individual plaintiffs who are con-
siderably less powerful as litigants. These defendants are strong
players, well-represented in the litigation game. They are also re-
peat players who care about their litigious image. Aware of their
power and eager to maintain a "hard-to-sue" reputation, these de-
fendants are likely to behave strategically.
Using d2 as a decision-controlling rule in such cases would re-
duce the defendants' use of strategic tactics. Knowing that factual
impasse will work against them, the defendants will be less optimis-
tic about the litigation. More importantly, defendants contemplat-
ing strategic tactics will no longer count on the plaintiffs' fear of
factual indeterminacy. To fully comprehend this point, we need to
look more closely at the evidential damage doctrine promulgating
d2 as a rule of decision for cases involving factual impasse.' 6' This
doctrine is not merely a pragmatically motivated tie-breaker. By
relating d2 to factual impasse, it will also tell the fact-finders that
the impasse and the evidential damage may be causally related to
each other. This possible causal relation will be considered as
working in both directions. Fact-finders will thus be prompted to
consider the damage as a proximate cause of the impasse; and they
will also be directed to consider the possibility of an impasse when
evidential damage is established. Threats displayed by defendants'
strategic tactics will therefore be unlikely to be taken seriously by
the plaintiffs. Knowing this, the defendants will become apprecia-
bly more inclined toward settlement. 62
160 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
161 This argument was inspired by Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Re-
considered, 66 IowA L. REv. 843 (1981) (urging to reconceptualize presumptions and simi-
lar provisions into explicit rules of decision furthering their underlying policies directly).
162 In some cases, this inclination will be further strengthened by the collateral estoppel
rules, through which the defendant's liability for evidential damage may be extended from
1997] 1951
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Because the defendant's negligence is likely to be contested,
the plaintiff will have no guarantee that the new rule of decision
will be activated in her particular case. The new rule will not there-
fore dispose the average plaintiff to adopt strategic tactics.
Although strengthened by this rule, the average plaintiff would still
feel pressurized by the uncertainty of the case.
Our argument may still face a possible critique that supports
the P>0.5 rule. According to this critique, the P>0.5 rule impels
evidentially damaged plaintiffs to accept low-pay settlements read-
ily offered by defendants. The proposed burden-shifting rule
would thus arguably bring the settlement rate down. This critique
is misdirected. First, low-pay settlements entered into by eviden-
tially damaged plaintiffs are likely to be both inefficient and un-
fair. 163 Furthermore, we doubt that they will be reached in a
significant number of cases without the proposed shifting of the
persuasion burden. In a typical case, the plaintiff will attempt to
establish that the evidential damage inflicted upon her by the de-
fendant was inflicted intentionally. True or not, this allegation will
entail a non-negligible possibility of the plaintiff's victory, predi-
cated upon adverse inferences that might be drawn against the de-
fendant. Aware of this possibility, the plaintiff will be unlikely to
settle the case for a nuisance value. To be sure, a more substantial
offer may induce the plaintiff to settle, but, for reasons already
given, the defendant will not be inclined to make such an offer
under the P>0.5 rule. The P>0.5 rule would thus keep the parties'
positions on settlement far apart.
Asymmetrical information is clearly an impediment to settle-
ment. The proposed rule of decision would partially remove this
impediment. By reversing the persuasion burden and by signalling
to the fact-finders that the factual impasse and the evidential dam-
age are interrelated, this rule undercuts the decisive power of infor-
mation and evidence. It informs both the fact-finders and the
parties that lack of information may bring the plaintiff a victory.
Information held exclusively by the defendant, however supportive
of his case, would consequently be less likely to dissuade him from
one case to another. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral
Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA
L. REv. 141, 184-86 (1984).
163 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, On the Difference Between Settlement Terms and the Ex-
pected Judgment (unpublished manuscript, July 1996) (on file with the authors) (demon-
strating the inefficiency of settlements not reflecting the expected judgment and that such
settlements are likely to unduly favor the party with lower litigation costs, e.g., an institu-
tional defendant benefiting from a fee-discount).
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negotiating a settlement. As for the plaintiff, knowing that his in-
formation is wanting and thus still facing uncertainty, he would not
hesitate to join the negotiation table.
These implications of the proposed rule will materialize when
the litigants are reasonably averse toward risk. Litigants uncom-
monly prone to risk-taking will not be affected by this rule.164 Sub-
ject to this reservation, it can safely be concluded that the proposed
rule will facilitate efficient settlements.
Finally, the proposed rule would provide an important evi-
dence-straightening incentive. Under the P>0.5 rule, factual ambi-
guity that may lead to an impasse benefits defendants. When a
defendant believes his case to be strong, he will put his evidence
straight. This, however, is unlikely to happen when a defendant
does not believe his case to be strong. This defendant may consider
putting his evidence straight in order to make his argument more
convincing. Ultimately, it would be more rational for him to resist
this temptation because, the straighter the evidence the more fal-
sifiable it is. Because the defendant's case is relatively weak, his
evidence, if put straight, would be exposed to a potentially success-
ful falsifying attack. There is therefore a clear incentive for such
defendants to complicate the fact-finders' evidential base by intro-
ducing ambiguities into the evidence. Uncommitted to a tidy fac-
tual account, ambiguous evidence tends to be unamenable to
falsification. Yet, despite this predicament to fact-ascertainment,
the P>0.5 rule is generally justified, because to reverse the persua-
sion burden would allow plaintiffs to create and benefit from evi-
dential ambiguities.
Cases involving evidential damage inflicted by defendants
should, however, be regarded as special. This view is supported by
two reasons. A defendant seeking refuge in factual ambiguity will
be likely to find it in virtually every such case. More importantly, a
defendant will usually be in a much better position than the plain-
tiff to make good the evidential damage, or at least partially miti-
gate it through inquiries that may generate substitute evidence. 65
164 As for litigants with extreme risk-aversion, they will nearly always reach settlements,
bearing in mind Learned Hand's famous remark: "After now some dozen years of experi-
ence I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short
of sickness and death." Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the
Matter, in LEcruJREs ON LEGAL Topics, 1921-1922, at 89, 105 (1926).
165 A story underlying the path-breaking spoliation tort case in the United States, Smith
v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Ct. App. 1984), corroborates this observation. After
the California Supreme Court's holding that the plaintiff could proceed with her spoliation
tort action against Abbott Ford, the latter found the missing evidence and the case was
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An average defendant will therefore always be the most efficient
avoider of factual impasse, which justifies shifting from d, to d2 as a
controlling rule of decision.166 The higher the likelihood of being
held responsible for evidential damage, the greater the chance that
the defendant will attempt to put his case straight, without seeking
refuge in factual ambiguity. Committed to a tidy factual account,
his evidence will unfold itself to scrutiny, thus either surviving or
not surviving the plaintiff's falsifying attempts. The informational
deficiency will consequently be compensated for, partially or even
entirely. 167
The proposed rule seemingly motivates plaintiffs to create and
benefit from factual ambiguities. However, in reality, this would
not be the case. Being evidentially damaged already, the average
plaintiff would be reluctant to introduce ambiguities into the ex-
isting evidence because these ambiguities can easily downgrade his
case by placing it below the balance-of-probabilities threshold.
This reluctance will be further intensified by the defendant's antici-
pated attempt to put his own defence forward and unambiguously
substantiate it by the evidence. Plaintiffs will therefore also be
likely to put their evidence straight, thus facilitating the fact-find-
ing process.
Benefits deriving from the proposed rule can thus clearly be
seen as outweighing the gains associated with the P>0.5 rule.
B. Evidential Damage from the Fairness Perspective
Unlike its efficiency-based alternative, the fairness perspective
distributes the risk of error evenly over issues, rather than in a
fashion that systematically favors defendants over plaintiffs. As
such, it branches into two normatively sustainable principles that
embody two different conceptions of "fairness." One of them is
settled out of court. See Pati Jo Pofahl, Comment, Smith v. Superior Court: A New Tort of
Intentional Spoliation of Evidence, 69 MrNr. L. RFv. 961, 961 n.4 (1985).
166 This observation will not hold true in cases not involving evidential damage, where
evidence possessed by a party is obtainable through discovery, by instituting a threat of
adverse inferences or by requiring the party to discharge the production burden. After
producing the required evidence, the party can no longer be regarded as the most efficient
avoider of factual impasse. The question whether there is factual impasse will arise only at
the end of the trial, when the existing evidential resources were exhausted. At this stage,
the party's former possession of some of the evidence will be irrelevant.
167 This is especially likely to happen in cases which involve institutional defendants,
such as doctors and hospitals who failed to comply with their record-retaining duties, man-
ufacturers producing hazardous substances, employers inadequately monitoring the proce-
dures preceding their employment decisions, and so forth. Some casual tortfeasors will




known as the "civility principle."'. The other was promulgated
under the name of equality. 169 We now turn to discuss these princi-
ples and their effect on the allocation of the risk of error in civil
trials. We will demonstrate that each of these principles neatly ac-
commodates the evidential damage doctrine and its risk-allocating
rule.
1. Evidential Damage Under the Civility Principle
According to the principal exponent of this principle, Profes-
sor Dale Nance, citizens should be presumed to be acting in com-
pliance with the standards prescribed by the law. The state should
be bound by this presumption not only in criminal trials, but also in
adjudicating a private dispute. A person attributing a wrongdoing
to another must therefore prove her allegation by a preponderance
of the evidence. 170 Accordingly, in a breach-of-contract lawsuit,
the breach and the consequent damage must be preponderantly es-
tablished by the plaintiff; allegations brought forward as defenses,
e.g., misrepresentation, bad faith, and unreasonable non-mitigation
of the damage, must, in turn, be proved by the defendant. In a tort
action, the defendant's negligence and the resulting damage must
be established by the plaintiff; and it is incumbent upon the defend-
ant to prove the existence of a contributory fault, or the facts acti-
vating the volenti non fit injuria doctrine, should she rely upon one
of those defenses. The civility principle thus largely fits the preva-
lent legal doctrine that requires a plaintiff to preponderantly estab-
lish the facts underlying his cause of action, and shifts the same
burden to the defendant in relation to any affirmative defense.' 7 '
Professor Nance's analysis does not explicitly accommodate
"excuses" that function as defenses not only in criminal, but also in
civil actions. Take, for example, a unilateral mistake advanced as a
ground for absolving the person who committed it from contractual
liability. It is obvious that the facts underlying this affirmative de-
fense must be established by this person.172 At the same time, this
person cannot be described as attributing a wrongdoing to her ad-
versary. On the contrary: a person entering into a contract upon
her unilateral mistake will not squarely align with civility if she sub-
sequently disavows any responsibility that derives from the con-
168 See Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
647, 663-67 (1994).
169 See Stein, supra note 2, at 338.
170 Nance, supra note 168.




tract. Yet, although the conduct in question falls below the general
standard, the law makes concessions to human frailty by treating a
mistake as a valid excuse. 173 This concession is conditioned upon
the requirement that any excuse must be preponderantly estab-
lished by its proponent, which would hardly strike anyone as
counterintuitive.
The civility principle should therefore accommodate this re-
quirement by removing its presumption from excuses.' 74 At a
more general level, it should prescribe that any wrongdoing per-
taining to the disposition of the case should shift the persuasion
burden to the wrongdoer. 75 Litigants violating the civility require-
ment would thus no longer benefit from the civility presumption.
In a trial involving an evidential damage negligently inflicted by
the defendant, it is the defendant, not the plaintiff, who would con-
sequently bear the risk of error.' 76
2. Evidential Damage Under the Equality Principle
This principle holds that the state, acting through its judges as
an arbiter of civil disputes, and ultimately forcing its dispute-
resolving decisions upon litigants, ought to treat those litigants with
equal concern and respect. 177 Hence, every dollar undeservedly
lost, either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, ought to be re-
garded as equally regrettable. Risk of error in civil litigation should
thus be allocated equally between the parties, which means that it
should be allocated in a way that does not favor one party over
another.178
Virtually every substantive law structures judicial decisions by
placing them within strictly dichotomous legal categories, such as
"contract/no-contract," "tort/no-tort," "will/no-will," and so
173 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 677-78.
174 Application of this principle would still encounter problems in "dichotomous liabil-
ity" cases, where liability for the litigated damage can be ascribed to either the plaintiff or
the defendant. In a balanced case, by holding the defendant not responsible for the dam-
age, judges will violate the civility presumption in relation to the plaintiff. See Stein, supra
note 2, at 337-38.
175 See id
176 The same outcome (mutatis mutandis) should be arrived at when a defendant eviden-
tially damaged by the plaintiff seeks to establish an affirmative defence.
177 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIoTrrs SERIOUSLY chs. 3 & 4 (1977); RONALD
DWORXIN, LAW's Empsipa chs. 6 & 7 (1986).
178 This principle and its ramifications are discussed in detail in Stein, supra note 2. See
also James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil
Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79,85 (1982); Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty and
Ambiguity in Modem Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 634 (1994) (both
explaining allocation of the persuasion burden by the idea of equality).
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forth.179 Such laws require judges to adjudicate cases in an all-or-
nothing fashion. In a breach-of-contract lawsuit, judges thus have
to determine that the contract had either been made or not; that it
had either been breached or not; that it had either been frustrated
or not; that its conditions are either illegal or not, and so forth.
Risk of error involved in the determination of factual issues that
pertain to a single legal category cannot therefore be divided equi-
tably between the parties. If the equality principle were unrelated
to the substantive law, it could prescribe equitable sharing of that
risk by allowing a plaintiff to recover from the defendant in pro-
portion to the probability of the plaintiff's case. Being part of the
law of evidence and procedure, which combine into an adjective
legal mechanism aimed at implementing the substantive law, the
equality principle cannot, however, acquire such independence. 180
Unauthorized to divide risk of error as related to a single legal cat-
egory, the equality principle therefore shifts the entire risk to a
party whose factual allegations are supported by weaker reasons.
Consequently, a party.will prevail when her case preponderates
over that of her opponent on a balance of probabilities.
This, however, provides no tie-breaking rule for balanced
cases. Because the utility-based P>0.5 rule systematically favors
defendants over plaintiffs, it cannot be followed by the equality
principle even as a tie-breaker. The equality principle therefore
allocates risk of error also by dividing the discrete legal categories,
which pertain to specified classes of cases, between plaintiffs and
defendants. As a result of this division, facts relevant to a legal
category that benefits plaintiffs will have to be preponderantly es-
tablished by the plaintiff. Facts pertaining to a category benefiting
defendants will have to be established by the defendant at the same
level of probability. Each litigant will consequently carry the risk
of error in connection with her own allegations, i.e., only in connec-
tion with those facts that will make out her case under the control-
ling substantive law. Risk of error will thus be allocated between
the parties in roughly equal fashion.
The emerging doctrine thus becomes identical to the risk-allo-
cating doctrine prescribed by the civility principle. Under each of
179 Dworkin named such categories "dispositive concepts" because the law requires
judges to dispose cases only through them. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRiNCI-
PLE ch. 5 (1986).
180 For discussion of the adjectivity notion see Postema, supra note 122. For possibilities
of perceiving procedural and evidentiary principles as valuable per se, independently of
their impact on the outcome of the trial, see Robert Summers, Evaluating and Improving
Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974).
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these doctrines, facts constitutive of a plaintiff's cause of action will
have to be preponderantly established by the plaintiff; and it will
be incumbent upon the defendant to establish the facts underlying
his defenses as being more probable than not. The equality princi-
ple therefore explains the conventional legal doctrine no less co-
gently than its civility-based counterpart, and perhaps even
better. 81
In a balanced case, where the conflicting allegations brought
by the parties are equally supported by the evidence, information
lost through one of the parties' fault should be considered as hav-
ing a tie-breaking potential. To decide the case in favor of the
party whose fault prevented the judges from considering this infor-
mation would therefore clash with a widely shared intuition about
justice holding that people should not be allowed to benefit from
their own wrongs.
This intuition receives confirmation from the equality princi-
ple. The tie-breaking rule set by this principle is meant to control
cases where everything else is equal, a premise that does not hold
true when one of the parties is peculiarly responsible for the evi-
dential gap. This factor should tilt the scales to the benefit of the
faultless party. The scales should be tilted in that direction because
risk of error associated with the lost information should be borne
by either the plaintiff or the defendant, and because a decision as-
signing this risk to its producer would be grounded upon better
reasons than its alternative. If no evidential damage were inflicted,
by bringing out and substantiating her allegations, each party
would have exposed her adversary to a reciprocal risk of error. s2
The same would hold true, if the damage were inflicted non-negli-
gently: in the absence of fault, lack of evidence can be equally at-
tributed to both parties. Risk of error existing in such cases cannot
therefore be perceived as a non-reciprocal risk that deserves spe-
cial treatment. The picture changes dramatically when a party to a
proceeding negligently inflicts an evidential damage upon her op-
ponent. Aggravated by the unilateral lack of care, the resulting
risk of error would not be reciprocal. By transcending the accepted
181 See Stein, supra note 2, at 333-42.
182 Predicated on the assumption that the parties' forensic opportunities are roughly
equal, this point is at risk of being perceived as divorced from the socio-economic reality.
It is not. We believe that evidentiary rules simply cannot help to resolve the social inequal-
ity problem. State-funded legal representation and counselling will do a far better job. But
see Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AF's. 303
(1988) (a controversial proposal to set the maximal level for trial advocacy and even cut
down the quality of judicial process as a means of counteracting forensic inequality).
1958 [Vol. 18:1891
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level of risk, this risk would disrupt the equilibrium protected by
the equality principle. The evidential damage doctrine is therefore
called upon to eliminate such disruptions by resolving factual im-
passe in favor of the party facing a non-reciprocal risk of error.
8 3
Equality in risk-allocation can properly be maintained only in this
way.
C. A Caveat
A rule that resolves balanced cases against negligent produ-
cers of evidential damage can thus be seen as both fair and effi-
cient. Its application, however, may become both inefficient and
unfair if the rule is allowed to facilitate factually extravagant alle-
gations. A revealing example of such misapplication of the rule
was provided by a medical malpractice case, decided by the Israeli
Supreme Court.184
THE DOUBLE-SURGERY CASE
The plaintiff underwent a simple operation. Due to his preexist-
ing psychiatric condition, this operation caused emotional de-
pression. Because the operation had been essential for the
plaintiff's health, the ensuing emotional damage was not com-
pensable. During the plaintiff's presurgical treatment negli-
gence occurred, which led to further surgery aggravating the
plaintiff's depression. This compensable damage merged into
the plaintiff's non-compensable damage.
Unable to unravel the entanglement, the Israeli Supreme
Court rightly treated it as evidential damage for which the defend-
ants are responsible. Consequently, it held that the risk of non-
persuasion, as related to the magnitude of the plaintiff's compensa-
ble damage, should be borne by the defendants. This holding led
the court to decide that the defendants should compensate the
plaintiff for his total damage. 185
Because it was clear that the defendants are responsible only
for a fraction of that damage, the court's decision did not break the
tie between equally probable scenarios. Instead, it simply overcom-
pensated the plaintiff by adopting the least probable scenario.
Meant to apply only in adjudicating conflicting factual allegations
183 This argument was inspired by Fletcher, supra note 81.
184 C.A. 285/86, Nagar v. Vilensky, 43(3) P.D. 284.
185 It thus echoes the approach taken in Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 644 (K.B.
1722), and in McGhee v. Nat'l Coal Bd., [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.).
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that are equally probable, the proposed rule would not sanction
such decisions. 8 6
VII. EPILOGUE
Customary in courts of law and in law reviews, summing-up is
reputed to be an uneasy endeavor, especially when preceded by an
extensive argument that integrates examples, digressions, and tex-
tual footnotes. This Article is no exception. Laconic reiteration of
all its arguments will sound unduly repetitious, and not without
reason. Their selective reiteration will avoid superficiality at a cost
of installing artificial hierarchy between our ideas. Unable to re-
solve this dilemma, we decided simply to avoid it by pointing to a
single and inevitably more abstract idea that hangs our arguments
together.
This idea requires only one sentence: because uncertainty is
detrimental to the allocation of liability, the law should impose lia-
bility for uncertainty. This liability will not be costless. It will place
an additional burden upon the law's shoulders by opening up new
issues for adjudication, by creating new problems and by projecting
new behavioral incentives which cannot be predicted with cer-
tainty. We nonetheless believe (and hopefully have persuaded our
readers) that the benefits of the new liability doctrine will outweigh
its costs. Unaided by this doctrine, the law may too easily be
defeated.
186 The court could have adopted the scenario most favorable to the plaintiff only if it
found it to be at least as probable as not. Expert testimony obtained from psychiatrists
could have assisted the court in discharging this task. This way of resolving the problem
was adopted by the Jerusalem District Court in Sharvit v. Shaarey Zedek Hospital. C.A.
733/91 (V. Zeiler, C.J.) (unpublished opinion). In this case, the plaintiff was wrongly diag-
nosed by the defendant as not suffering from breast cancer. Her cancerous growth was
consequently left without treatment until its belated discovery. When it was discovered,
the plaintiff's condition left her only slim chances to survive. No evidence concerning the
size of the plaintiff's tumor at her initial check-up was available. The court ruled that by
misdiagnosing and thus making the plaintiff unaware of her previous condition, the defend-
ant had inflicted upon her serious evidential damage. Experts' estimations as to the devel-
opment of the plaintiff's cancer pointed to a variety of possibilities. The court ultimately
chose the estimation pointing to the most rapid development of the cancer, justifying its
decision by the defendant's liability for the evidential damage. Consequently, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had an excellent chance to recover at the time that she was
misdiagnosed. This ruling increased the plaintiff's compensation most dramatically.
Another plausible solution of the problem would have been to allow the plaintiff to
recover compensation for the lost chance to establish the magnitude of her damage. See
supra Part IV.B. This solution would have granted the plaintiff smaller compensation.
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